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NOTES
"MAY WE HAVE THE LAST DANCE?" STATES TAKE
AIM AT CORPORATE RAIDERS AND CRASH THE
PREDATOR'S BALL
In 1968 Virginia became the first state to enact a state statute (Virginia
Act) to regulate tender offers.' The Virginia Act required a person bidding
to acquire a controlling interest in a target corporation2 to disclose specific
information 3 to the target corporation's shareholders before acquiring the
shareholders' shares. 4 Four months after Virginia enacted its takeover
disclosure legislation, however, Congress enacted the Williams Act,5 which
subjects tender offerors to advance disclosure requirements. 6 Even after
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (1973) (repealed). In the Take-Over-Bid Disclosure
Act (Virginia Act) that Virginia enacted in 1968, the Virginia state legislature attempted to regulate
numerous aspects of the tender offer process, including the duration of a takeover bid. Id.; see
L. Loss, FumDAmENrAms OF SECumms REGULATION 601 (1983) (discussing Virginia's leading role
in state regulation of tender offers). Additionally, the Virginia Act required persons attempting a
tender offer to notify the Virginia State Corporation Commission (Commission) of the takeover
bid and to disclose specific information, such as the terms and conditions of the takeover bid, to
the Commission. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (1973) (repealed); see L. Loss, FuND Aaz Ais
OF Sacuarrs REouLAnoN 601 (1983) (discussing disclosure requirements of Virginia Act).
2. VA. CODE ANN § 13.1-529 (1973) (repealed). The Virginia Act defied a target corpo-
ration, or offeree company, as a corporation incorporated under the laws of Virginia and doing
business in Virginia whose shares were the subject of a tender offer. Id.
3. VA. CODE Am. § 13.1-531 (1973) (repealed). The Virginia Act required that the tender
offeror disclose to the Commission and the target corporation, among other specifics, the terms
of the takeover bid, the funding plan of the bid, any plans of liquidation that would dissolve the
target corporation, and complete information on the organization and operations of the tender
offeror. Id.
4. Id. Under the Virginia Act, the Commission or target corporation could call for a
hearing, which would enable the Commission to determine whether the tender offeror proposed
to make fair and effective disclosure, before the tender offer could proceed. Id.
5. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 954 (1968) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)).
6. Id., see generally Note, The Constitutionality of Second Generation Takeover Statutes,
73 VA. L. REv. 203, 205-207 (1987) (discussing Williams Act). Certain provisions of the Williams
Act added sections 13(d) and 14(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") that
require tender offerors to provide detailed and timely disclosure of takeover bids to the shareholders
of target corporations. See 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982) (provisions of 1934 Act);
Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982) (incorporating provisions of Williams Act into 1934
Act); Note, supra, at 205-06 nn.12-15 (discussing codification of Williams Act and relation of
Williams Act to provisions of 1934 Act). Section 13(d) of the 1934 Act requires a tender offeror
that beneficially owns more than five percent of the outstanding shares of a publicly held
corporation to file a statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) within ten
days after acquiring more than five percent of the target corporation's stock. Williams Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d)(i) (1982); see 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-I (1988) (regulations for disclosure statement);
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Congress passed the Williams Act, many states still continued to try to
regulate takeovers. 7 Numerous individuals, however, challenged state ef-
forts to regulate corporate tender offers, claiming that the state statutes
were unconstitutional under the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution or that the Williams Act preempted the state statutes.8
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, most courts that considered the
constitutionality of state statutes regulating takeovers rendered the statutes
unconstitutional. 9 The United States Supreme Court, in Edgar v. MITE
Corp.,10 first attempted to analyze the legitimacy of state regulation of
takeovers in light of the Williams Act and the United States Constitution."
In MITE a plurality of the Supreme Court suggested that the Illinois
Business Takeover Act (Illinois Act) was invalid by finding that the
Note, supra at 205 nn.14-15 (discussing § 13(d) of 1934 Act). In the section 13(d) disclosure
statement, the tender offeror must disclose five general items of information regarding the proposed
acquisition, including the background, residence, and citizenship of the tender offeror, the extent
of the tender offeror's holdings in the corporation, the source and amount of funds used in the
acquisition, the purpose of the acquisition, and any additional information regarding the contracted
stock purchase agreements. Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(A)-(E) (1982); see Note, supra,
at 206 (discussing § 13(d) provisions of 1934 Act).
While section 13(d) mandates certain disclosures when an acquisition results in ownership of
more than five percent of a public target corporation's shares, section 14(d) of the 1934 Act
(section 14(d)) also regulates tender offers that increase a tender offeror's holdings in a corporation
to more than five percent of the equity securities at a corporation. Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78n(d)(1); see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(2) (1986) (14(d) regulations of disclosure statement); Note,
supra at 206 (discussing requirements of § 14(d)). Section 14(d) requires holders of a target
corporation's stock to disclose certain information that is similar to the informational requirements
of section 13(d) by filing a statement simultaneously with the target corporation and with the SEC
to assist shareholders in making informed decisions and ensure that all shareholders receive equal
treatment in the tender offer process. Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)o) (1982), 17 C.F.R. §
240.14d-3(b) to -8 (1986) (discussing regulations providing for shareholder rights against bidder in
tender offer); Note, supra, at 206-07 nn.17-22 (discussing shareholder protections in § 14(d) tender
offer situations).
7. See S. Pam, no, CAN STATES STOP ColpoRaTa TAxaovEas?, 3 (Investor Responsibility
Research Center 1987) (noting that companies feeling unprotected by Williams Act turned to states
for greater protection and that by 1982 thirty-seven states had enacted laws that required greater
disclosure than Williams Act).
8. See, e.g., Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951
(1980) (holding that Williams Act controls tender offer notice requirements and thus preempts
state notice provisions); Canadian Pacific Enter. (U.S.) Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192, 1198-
1203 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (finding early Ohio takeover statute preempted by Williams Act notice
requirements); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782, 786-90 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (finding Pennsylvania
takeover statute unconstitutional as violation of commerce clause and Williams Act).
9. See supra note 8 (discussing cases rendering state takeover statutes invalid for violating
commerce clause and provisions of Williams Act).
10. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
11. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); see U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (prohibiting
states from interfering with interstate commerce and giving Congress full power to regulate
commerce between states); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.51-.65 (Smith-Hurd 1979)
(repealed) (containing provisions of Illinois Business Take-Over Act); supra note 6 (discussing
Williams Act); infra notes 24-40 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Illinois Act that
Supreme Court scrutinized in MITE).
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Williams Act preempted the Illinois Act, while the Court concluded that
the Illinois Act unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce in viola-
tion of the commerce clause.' 2 After the Court's decision in MITE, many
states enacted laws, or amended existing laws, designed to avoid the
constitutional problems that the Illinois Act created. 13 Lower federal
courts, however, consistently invalidated those "second generation"
statutes 14 by applying the Williams Act preemption test and commerce
clause inquiry utilized by the Court in MITE.
5
In 1987, however, the Supreme Court, in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America,'6 scrutinized another state effort to regulate tender
offers and, for the first time, upheld as constitutional a state takeover
statute. 7 Because the Supreme Court in CTS determined that provisions
of state legislation regulating tender offers may be constitutional, many
states attempting to regulate tender offers have adopted statutes that are
similar to the Indiana Act.' 8 Other states, however, have adopted fair
price statutes19 that require a bidder in a tender offer to offer shareholders
12. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640-46 (1982); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3
(prohibiting states from interfering with interstate commerce and giving Congress full power to
regulate commerce between states); Ii. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.51-.65 (Smith-Hurd
1979) (repealed) (containing provisions of Illinois Business Take-Over Act); supra note 6 (discussing
Williams Act); infra notes 24-40 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Illinois Act that
Supreme Court scrutinized in MTE).
13. See P. PAmrnwo, supra note 7, at 3 (discussing state attempts after MITE to regulate
tender offers); see, e.g., MD. CoRPs. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 1-102(a), 3-601 to -603 (1985 &
Supp. 1988) (containing Maryland's takeover statute); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 912(a)(13) (Mc-
Kinney 1986 & Supp. 1988) (containing New York's takeover statute, which applies only to
corporations incorporated under New York law); Oimo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.01(Y) (Baldwin
1986 & Supp. 1987) (containing Ohio's takeover statute, which applies only to corporations with
fifty or more shareholders and substantial place of business, principal executive offices, or
substantial assets within Ohio).
14. See S. PAmzsrro, supra note 7, at 3 (describing takeover laws enacted after MITE as
"second generation" statutes); Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA.
LAW Ray. 111, 113-16 (1987) (describing post- MITE takeover statutes as second generation
statutes).
15. See Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 754-56, 760-64 (S.D. Ohio
1986) (holding Ohio control share acquisition statute unconstitutional because statute interfered
with interstate commerce and was preempted by Williams Act), aff'd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir.
1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 1023 (1987); APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen Air Inc., 622 F.
Supp. 1216, 1219-24 (D. Minn. 1985) (Minnesota Control Share Acquisition Act violated commerce
clause since act applied not only to corporations incorporated in Minnesota with at least fifty
shareholders residing in Minnesota but also to foreign corporations with assets in Minnesota valued
at greater than one million dollars). See generally S. P Am'nmro, supra note 7, at 25-31 (discussing
court decisions that consistently have held state takeover statutes unconstitutional).
16. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
17. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1652 (1987); see IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to 23-1-42-11 (Burns Supp. 1988) (containing Indiana Control Share Acquisitions
section of Indiana Business Corporation Law).
18. See infra notes 99-123 and accompanying text (discussing state takeover statutes that
states adopted after Supreme Court upheld Indiana Act as constitutional).
19. See infra notes 144-172 and accompanying text (discussing fair price tender offer statutes).
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of a target corporation the same tender offer price as the bidder paid
throughout the entire acquisition. 20 Still other states have enacted "free-
zeout" laws that do not regulate takeovers as such, but prohibit statutorily-
defined "business combinations" for a specific period of time after an
acquisition. 2' In reviewing these state attempts at controlling takeovers,
courts have attempted to analyze the Supreme Court's reasoning in MITE
and CTS regarding the roles of the Williams Act and the commerce clause
in relation to state takeover statutes. 22 By applying the Supreme Court's
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Aim. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, ch. 6 (1977 & Supp. 1987) (containing Arizona's
business combination provisions); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-43-1 to 23-1-43-24 (Burns Supp. 1988)
(containing Indiana's business combination provisions); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271A.397 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) (containing Kentucky's business combination statute); MnqN. STAT.
ANN. § 302A.673 (West Supp. 1988) (containing Minnesota's business combination provisions);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.459 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (containing Missouri's business combination
provisions); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A-10-1 (West 1969 & Supp. 1988) (containing New Jersey's
business combination provisions); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1988)
(containing New York's business combination statute); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. tit. 23A, ch.
23A.20 (1969 & Supp. 1988) (containing Washington's business combination provisions); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 180.7250)(mm), .725(5)-.725(6) (West Supp. 1988) (containing Wisconsin's business
combination provisions). New York enacted a statute that forbids any "business combination"
(as defined) between a target corporation and a twenty percent or more shareholder for five years
after acquisition of the twenty percent or more block of stock unless, prior to the acquisition, the
target corporation's management had approved either the stock acquisition or the proposed business
combination. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 912 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1988). After five years, such
a business combination requires approval of a disinterested majority of shareholders or payment
of a statutorily-defined fair price. Id.
Most notably, on February 2, 1988, Delaware enacted a modified version of the New York
statute. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 203 (1988). Delaware's law prohibits any "business combination"
(as defined) between a corporation and a fifteen percent or more shareholder ("interested
stockholder") for three years following the date on which such shareholder became an interested
stockholder. Id. The prohibition does not apply if (i) prior to the date of acquisition by the
interested stockholder the board of directors approved either the proposed business combination
or the acquisition of the stock, or (ii) the interested stockholder's holdings rise in one transaction
from less than fifteen percent to eighty-five percent (excluding stock of certain insiders and
employee stock plans) or more of all outstanding shares; or (iii) a business combination is approved
by the board of directors and by an affirmative vote of at least 66 2/3% of the outstanding
voting stock not owned by the interested stockholder. Id. The board of directors may decide to
"opt out" of the statute within ninety days of its effective date. Id. After that, a corporation
may opt out of the statute by amending its certificate of incorporation or bylaws by an affirmative
vote of a majority of the shares entitled to vote. Id. The amendment will not be effective for
twelve months, however. Id.
22. See, e.g., Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 845, 848-52 (lst Cir.
1988) (court's Williams Act preemption test and commerce clause analysis based on MITE and
CTS decisions); BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 463-72 (D. Del. 1988) (court's
analysis of Delaware takeover statute focuses on MITE and CTS); TLX Acquisition Corp. v.
Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022, 1030-34 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (Court's analysis of state takeover
statute controlled by MITE and CTS decisions); see infra notes 26-40, 45-88 and accompanying
text (discussing MTE and CTS constitutionality tests). The United States Supreme Court's decision
in Edgar v. MITE Corp. and CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am. represent the Court's only
two inquiries into the legitimacy of state involvement with and regulation of tender offers. See
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1644-52 (1987) (focusing on two part
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reasoning, courts might find that the takeover statutes that states enacted
both before and after the CTS decision are constitutional.
23
The MITE Decision
Prior to the CTS decision, MITE was the only decision in which the
Supreme Court had analyzed the constitutionality of state tender offer
regulations. 24 In MITE the Illinois state legislature enacted a state statute
that required specific steps be taken by a bidder before a tender offer
could proceed. 25 The Supreme Court, in invalidating the Illinois takeover
legislation, determined in MITE that the Illinois Act had both jurisdictional
and potentially substantive flaws. 26 A plurality of the Court suggested that
the Illinois Act violated the provisions of the Williams Act, while the
MITE Court conclusively held that the Illinois Act violated the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution.
27
In establishing the criteria that the Illinois Act needed to meet to pass
constitutional scrutiny, the Supreme Court first looked to the provisions
of the Williams Act.28 A central concern of the Williams Act, a plurality
of the MITE Court concluded, was that shareholders and tender offerors
should be free to deal with one another without unreasonable delay. 29 The
Illinois Act, however, delayed takeover bids by creating a waiting period
before a bidder could proceed with a proposed tender offer and enabled
Illinois further to delay a bid by requiring the Illinois Secretary of State
to hold an administrative hearing to determine the fairness of the offer
inquiry into provisions of Williams Act and interstate commerce analysis); Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624, 630-46 (1982) (same).
23. Compare infra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Minnesota
Control Acquisition Act) with Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 839-45 (D.
Minn. 1986) (prior to Supreme Court's decision in CTS, Minnesota takeover legislation held to
be invalid), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987) (vacating as moot
District Court's finding of Minnesota statute as unconstitutional); see infra notes 46-90 and
accompanying text (discussing qualities of Indiana's Control Share Acquisitions statute (Indiana
Act) that, under CTS, render the Indiana Act constitutional and not subject to federal preemption).
24. See CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1639, 1643, 1645 (basing decision on inquiries set forth in MITE
and comparisons of Indiana Act in CTS to Illinois Act in MITE); S. PA swnro, supra note 7,
at 9 ( MITE represented Supreme Court's initial inquiry into relationship between federal laws
and state attempts at regulating tender offers).
25. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 634-40 (1982). See infra notes 30-35 and accom-
panying text (discussing notice requirements of Illinois Business Take-Over Act (Illinois Act)).
26. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 637-45 (1982).
27. Id. at 639, 643.
28. Id. at 632-38; see supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing requirements of
Williams Act).
29. Id. at 634-39. A plurality of the Court in MITE concluded that the legislative intent
behind the Williams Act indicated that shareholders needed to be free to make their own decisions
regarding the fairness of tender offers. Id. at 637-39. Delays in the tender offer process, the MITE
Court plurality concluded, could hinder the shareholders' opportunities to make their own decisions
regarding tender offers by allowing the target corporation to repurchase its own shares, issue
additional shares of stock, arrange for a defensive merger, or institute litigation challenging, and
thus effectively preempting, a tender offer. Id. at 638, n.13.
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and adequacy of disclosure before a tender offer could proceed. 30 Addi-
tionally, the plurality of the Court suggested that the central goal behind
the Williams Act was to protect shareholders by maintaining a balance
between the target corporation's management, the tender offeror, and the
target corporation's shareholders. 3' The Supreme Court in MITE recog-
nized that the Illinois Act's requirement that the bidder disclose the tender
offer terms to the target corporation in advance of the bid's effective date
gave the target corporation's management an advantage over the bidder
in communicating with the shareholders.3 2 Of central importance to a
plurality of the MITE Court, therefore, was that this advantage conflicted
with the purported neutrality that the Williams Act mandates between the
tender offeror, target corporation, and shareholders of the target corpo-
ration. 33 The plurality of the Supreme Court reasoned that the Williams
Act and the Williams Act's legislative history indicate that Congress
intended for shareholders to be free to make their own decisions.3 4 The
three justices of the plurality suggested, therefore, that the Williams Act
preempted the Illinois Act insofar as the Illinois Act allowed the Secretary
30. Id. at 637. Under the Illinois Act, the Secretary of State of Illinois could call a hearing
to determine the merits of a proposed tender offer. Id.; see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para.
137.57-A-.B (Smith-Hurd 1979), repealed by P.A. 83-365, § 1, eff. Sept. 14, 1983 (requiring tender
offeror to apply for state hearing into merits of tender offer). If the Secretary called the meeting,
the offer could not begin until the Secretary had completed the hearing. M/E, 457 U.S. at 637.
In addition, the Illinois Act did not establish any deadline by which the Secretary of State had to
complete the hearing. See also IL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.57-C-.D (Smith-Hurd 1979),
repealed by P.A. 83-365, § 1, eff. Sept. 14, 1983 (no time limit for state hearing after initiation
of tender offer); see also MITE, 457 U.S. at 637 (discussing provisions of Illinois Act). The
Supreme Court in MITE concluded that the hearing provisions in the Illinois Act gave the Secretary
the power to delay a tender offer indefinitely and gave the incumbent management of the target
corporation an opportunity to delay tender offers. MITE, 457 U.S. at 637.
31. MITE, 457 U.S. at 632-34; see supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing require-
ments of Williams Act).
32. MITE, 457 U.S. at 639-40. Under the provisions of the Illinois Act, the Illinois Secretary
of State could refuse to register a takeover offer if the Secretary of State determined that the
takeover offer was inequitable or that the tender offeror failed fully and fairly to disclose the
details of intent behind a tender offer to stockholders. Id. at 639. See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
121 1/2, para. 137.57.E (Smith-Hurd 1979), repealed by P.A. 83-65, § 1, eff. Sept. 14, 1983
(allowing Secretary of State of Illinois to halt tender offers). But see CRTF Corp. v. Federated
Dep't Stores, 679 F. Supp. 731, 732-34 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (Ohio provision mandating public
disclosure of takeover bid twenty days before bid becomes effective did not violate commerce
clause). In CRTF Corp. v. Federated Department Stores the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio considered whether the timing provisions of the Ohio takeover legislation
conflicted with the Williams Act and thus were invalid. Id. at 734. The CRTF court reasoned
that no per se restriction on state takeover statues exists. Id. at 734. Noting that a decision
declaring the Ohio statute unconstitutional would invalidate the statute, the CRTF court instead
chose to defer to the legislature's passage of the provisions. Id. at 735; see also Omo REv. CODE
ANNt. § 1707.041 (Baldwin 1987) (providing for precommencement public disclosure).
33. MITE, 457 U.S. at 633-34.
34. MITE, 457 U.S. at 639; see Pipe v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26-37 (1976)
(discussing legislative history of Williams Act, which indicates that Congress enacted Williams Act
to provide full and fair tender offer disclosure for benefit of shareholders).
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of State for Illinois to decide initially the substantive fairness of a tender
offer before the shareholders could make that determination.35
In addition to contrasting the provisions of the Illinois Act with the
provisions of the Williams Act, the Supreme Court in MITE considered
whether the Illinois Act unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce.
36
The Court recognized that the Illinois Act had a broad jurisdictional reach
since target corporations incorporated outside of Illinois and subject to
the takeover laws of other states potentially could be subject to the Illinois
Act. 37 The MITE Court reasoned that the Illinois Act was unconstitutional
since the Illinois Act indirectly regulated interstate commerce, including
commerce that was entirely outside Illinois.3" Since the Illinois Act pur-
portedly gave Illinois the power to determine whether a tender offer could
proceed outside the state as long as the target corporation had a substantial
connection to Illinois, the Court held that the Illinois Act unconstitution-
ally burdened interstate commerce. 39 Furthermore, the Court adopted a
balancing test to show that the burden the Illinois Act imposed on interstate
commerce was excessive in light of the local interests the Illinois Act
furthered. 40 The Court concluded that Illinois could have no interest in
regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations operating within
Illinois' borders.
4'
35. MITE, 457 U.S. at 639-40.
36. Id. at 640-46.
37. Id. at 641-42. Under the terms of the Illinois Act, every tender offer for a corporation
that had its principal executive offices in Illinois, its incorporation in Illinois, or at least ten percent
of its stated capital and paid-in surplus in Illinois was subject to the provisions of the Act. Id. at
642; see ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.52-10(2) (Smith-Hurd 1979), repealed by P.A.
83,65, § 1, eff. Sept. 14, 1983 (establishing qualifications that target corporations had to have to
become subject to provisions of Illinois Act).
38. Id. at 641-42. The Supreme Court in MITE recognized that, although the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution permits incidental regulation of interstate commerce
between states, the commerce clause prohibits direct regulation of interstate commerce. Id. at 640;
see also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (court must uphold state statute
that consistently affects interstate commerce incidently unless burden imposed on interstate com-
merce is clearly excessive when weighed against benefits to state); Shafer v. Farmer's Grain Co.,
268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925) (interference with interstate commerce by legitimate state statute can be
only incidental). The Court in MITE determined that the Illinois Act directly regulated and
potentially blocked interstate tender offers that could generate interstate transactions. MITE, 457
U.S. at 640. The Supreme Court concluded that the Illinois Act imposed an excessive burden on
interstate commerce in light of the local interests that the Act protected. Id. at 640, 643-46.
39. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643-46. The MITE Court conceded that Illinois had a legitimate
state objective in protecting local shareholders. Id. at 644. The Court, however, determined that
Illinois had no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders. Id. at 645-46.
40. Id. at 640.
41. Id. at 645-46. In rejecting the state's assertion that states traditionally can regulate the
internal affairs of domestic corporations, the Court in MITE asserted only that tender offers are
not representative of classic corporate internal affairs since tender offers only involve transfers of
stock by shareholders to third parties and do not implicate directly the internal affairs of the
target corporation. Id. at 645; see Great Western United Corp. v. K~idweli, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280
n.53 (5th Cir. 1978) (tender offers do not involve internal operations justifying state involvement
in target corporation).
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By striking down the Illinois Act, the MITE decision also effectively
invalidated the takeover laws of thirty-six other states. 42 Following the
MITE decision, federal and state courts consistently struck down all state
attempts at regulating tender offers. 43 States, however, sought to restruc-
ture their takeover laws after the MITE decision,4 and, consequently, the
Supreme Court again reviewed the constitutionality of tender offer legis-




In CTS the Supreme Court analyzed the Indiana Control Share Ac-
quisitions Act (Indiana Act) to see if the Indiana Act conflicted with the
Williams Act or unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce.4 6 The
essence of the Indiana Act is that an Indiana-based target corporation's
shareholders have authority to grant the voting rights of controlling shares
of the target corporations's stock that are acquired by the tender offeror.
47
Under the terms of the Indiana Act, a control share acquisition is an
acquisition of stock by any tender offeror that would place the tender
offeror in control of one-fifth, one-third, or a majority of the voting
power of the target corporation's stock. 48 Under the Indiana Act, however,
shares acquired causing the tender offeror to own each of these percentages
42. See S. PAaPsiNco, supra note 7, at 13 (MITE effectively invalidated every state takeover
statute existing in 1982).
43. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing state and federal court decisions
that struck down state takeover legislation after MITE).
44. See Oo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Baldwin 1986 & Supp. 1987), § 1701.832 (Baldwin
1986) (containing Ohio's control share acquisitions statute). Ohio restructured its takeover law in
the form of control share acquisition statute (Ohio Act) less than six months after the Supreme
court's decision in MITE. Osno REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Baldwin 1986 & Supp. 1987); S.
PAmiPnro, supra note 7, at 13. The Ohio Act's provisions apply only to corporations incorporated
in Ohio that had fifty or more shareholders, a principal place of business, principal executive
offices, or substantial assets within Ohio. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Baldwin 1986 &
Supp. 1987); see S. PAmmPiNro, supra note 7, at 13 (Ohio legislature tailored Ohio Act to overcome
MITE Court's objections to Illinois Act). In addition, the Ohio Act does not allow the state to
intervene in any tender offers that might occur wholly outside of Ohio. Oio REv. CODE ANN. §
1701.831 (Baldwin 1986 & Supp. 1987). The Ohio Act also requires shareholders to approve any
proposed tender offer before the tender offeror can acquire any shares of the target corporation.
Osno Rav. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Baldwin 1986 & Supp. 1987); see S. PAm'mrro, supra note
7, at 13-14 (discussing shareholder involvement in tender offer under Ohio Act, per mandate of
MITE Court); see also infra notes 99, 115 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Ohio
Act).
45. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987) (scrutinizing state
takeover legislation); infra notes 46-90 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's con-
stitutional analysis in CTS Corp).
46. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1644, 1648 (1987).
47. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1641-42. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to 23-1-42-9(a) (Burns
Supp. 1988) (defining Indiana Act's control share acquisition feature that allows shareholders to
give voting rights to tender offeror's shares of stock).
48. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 (Bums Supp. 1988); see CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1641 (discussing
practical effect of control share mechanism in takeover statutes).
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of stock only receive voting rights in the target corporation if shareholders
voting a majority of the disinterested shares in the target corporation
authorize the voting rights.49 The Indiana Act requires that the tender
offeror file a disclosure statement with the target corporation before such
a shareholder vote is held.5 0 The disclosure statement, the Indiana Act sets
forth, must include information regarding the tender offeror's identity,
the number of shares in the target corporation that the tender offeror
owns or seeks to own, and the percentage of stock ownership that the
acquisition would give or has given the tender offeror.5 1 After receiving
the tender offeror's disclosure statement, the Indiana Act further provides
that the target corporation management must hold -a special shareholders'
meeting, at the tender offeror's request and expense, within fifty days
after receiving the statement, to consider whether the tender offeror will
have voting rights in the target corporation.5 2 If the shareholder vote
denies the tender offeror voting rights or the tender offeror does not file
a disclosure statement within sixty days after the last acquisition of control
shares, the target corporation may redeem the tender offeror's shares at
a market price that the corporation determines is fair. 3
The CTS Court first considered whether the provisions of the Williams
Act preempted the Indiana Act's procedural requirements. 4 In MITE a
plurality of the Supreme Court suggested that the overall goal of the
Williams Act is to maintain equality between the target corporation's
management, the tender offeror, and the target corporation's shareholders
during the course of a tender offer. 5 The CTS Court, however, concluded
only that the overriding concern to the MITE Court plurality was that the
49. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (Bums Supp. 1988); see CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1641 (practical
effect of granting voting rights to tender offeror only through shareholder vote is to condition
acquisition of corporation on approval of majority of preexisting disinterested shareholders).
50. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-6 (Burns Supp. 1988).
51. Id.
52. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-7 (Bums Supp. 1988); see CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1641-42 (noting
effect of notice filing requirements and subsequent special shareholder meeting in shareholders'
consideration of tender offeror's voting rights).
53. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-10 (Burns Supp. 1988).
54. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1644-48. In questioning whether the Indiana Act's procedural
requirements conflict with the requirements of the Williams Act, the Court in CTS recognized
that the Williams Act imposes two basic requirements on a tender offeror. Id. at 1644. The Court
recognized that, first, the Williams Act requires the tender offeror to file a statement disclosing
information about the offer. Id.; see Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1982) (establishing
federal law disclosure requirements in tender offers); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-I, 240.14d-3 (1986)
(providing requirements of disclosure statement under federal law). The CTS Court recognized
that, second, the Williams Act and the regulations that govern the Williams Act establish procedural
rules to govern tender offers. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1644; see Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)(5)-
(7) (1982) (establishing federal procedural rules governing tender offers); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-
7(a)(l) (1986) (containing procedural requirements of tender offers).
55. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing MITE Court plurality's sug-
gestion that goal of Williams Act is to place shareholders, target corporation management, and
tender offeror on equal footing).
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Illinois Act favored the target corporation's management against tender
offerors, to the detriment of shareholders in violation of the Williams
Act's mandate of neutrality between the shareholders, the tender offeror,
and the target corporation's management.5 6 The CTS Court noted that the
Williams Act imposes two basic requirements on tender offerors. 7 The
Court observed that, first, the Williams Act requires the tender offeror to
file a statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
disclosing information about the offer. 58 The Court recognized that the
information on the SEC disclosure statement must include the tender
offeror's background and identity, the source and amount of funds that
the offeror will use in the purchase, the purpose of the purchase, and the
extent of the offeror's holdings in the target corporation. 9 The CTS Court
paralleled the disclosure requirements of the Indiana Act to the disclosure
information that the Williams Act necessitates. 60 The Court stated that,
second, the Williams Act imposes certain procedural rules to govern tender
offers, including the length of time that a tender offer must remain open
to shareholders .61 The Court also recognized that the Williams Act requires
that tender offers remain open for sixty days after the tender offeror
makes the offer to the target corporation's shareholders. 62 The CTS Court
determined that under the terms of the Indiana Act a bidder could receive
full voting rights of a target corporation's stock within fifty days of the
initial tender offer made by the bidder. 63 Additionally, the Court suggested
that the MITE Court did not suggest that all delays that state regulation
56. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1645. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 632-39 (plurality of Court concludes
that purpose of Williams Act is to maintain neutrality and balance between shareholders, tender
offerors, and target corporation management).
57. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1644; Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982); see supra note 6
and accompanying text (discussing requirements of Williams Act on tender offers); The CTS
Court's focus on the Williams Act was critical to the constitutionality of the Indiana Act since
the Williams Act would have preempted the Indiana Act if compliance with both the Williams
Act and the Indiana Act had been impossible. Id.; see Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (if state law makes execution of federal legislation impossible,
federal law preempts state law).
58. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1644; Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982); see supra note 6
and accompanying text (discussing disclosure requirements of Williams Act on tender offerors).
59. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1644; Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982); see supra note 6
and accompanying text (discussing specific details that Williams Act disclosure requirement in-
cludes).
60. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-6, 23-1-42-7; see CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1646-48 (recognizing
that disclosure regulatory provisions Indiana Act places on tender offers consistent with text and
purposes of Williams Act).
61. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1644; Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982); see supra note 6
and accompanying text (discussing procedural rules set forth by the Williams Act to govern tender
offers).
62. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1647; Williams Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982).
63. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1647; see IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-7 (Burns Supp. 1988) (target
corporation management must hold shareholder meeting to vote control share voting rights within
fifty days of tender offeror's request of management).
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of tender offers might cause necessarily conflict with the Williams Act. 4
The CTS Court determined that only unreasonable delays in the tender
offer process are prohibited.65 The Supreme Court in CTS recognized that,
if potential time delays concerned a tender offeror, the tender offeror
could make a conditional tender offer, offering to accept shares of a
target corporation on the condition that the shares receive voting rights
within a certain amount of time. 66 The CTS Court determined that time
delays in tender offers that are not unreasonable are constitutionally valid
since other state corporate laws already have the practical effect of limiting
or delaying a successful tender offer. 67 If Congress intended to preempt
all state laws that delay the acquisition of voting control following a
tender offer, the Court concluded, then Congress would have done so
explicitly.
68
Aside from recognizing that the Williams Act places specific disclosure
requirements on a tender offeror, the CTS Court focused on the fact that
the Indiana Act protected independent shareholders against both the tender
offeror and the target corporation's management by allowing the share-
holders to vote as a group.69 The Court determined that statutes like the
Indiana Act that protect independent shareholders against potentially
coercive tender offers also serve to further a basic purpose of the Williams
Act, which is to place shareholders on equal footing with tender offerors.
70
64. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1647; see Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 639 (1982) (recognizing
that shareholders and the tender offeror must be able to deal with one another without unreasonable
delay). In scrutinizing the plurality's approach in MITE, the CTS Court concluded that the bidder
should be able to launch a tender offer without unreasonable delay. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1647.
65. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1647.
66. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1647. The CTS Court determined that the Williams Act permits a
bidder to condition a tender offer on SEC approval and then subsequent shareholder approval.
Id.; see MacFadden Holdings, Inc. v. JB Acquisition Corp., 802 F.2d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 1986) (bidder
can condition tender offer to protect own interests if voting rights approval never vest in bidder).
67. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1647. The Supreme Court in CTS determined that the Williams Act,
if read to preempt any state statute that effectively limits or delays a bidder's free exercise of
power after the bidder's successful tender offer, would preempt many existing state corporate
laws. Id. For example, some state corporate laws permit corporations to stagger the terms of the
corporate directors and thus ensure that only a limited number of directors will be approved by
shareholders each year. Id. at 1647-48. The CIS Court concluded that, by staggering the terms
of directors, corporations may delay the time at which a successful offerer gains control of the
board of directors by having annual elections for only one class of directors each year. Id. at
1648. In addition, the Court reasoned that cumulative voting provisions further can delay the
ability of takeover bidders to gain control of target corporations. Id. The Court concluded that
if Congress, in passing the Williams Act, had intended to preempt all state laws that delay the
acquisition of voting control following a tender offer, then Congress would have explicitly done
so. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1646. But see Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 632-34 (1982) (plurality
maintains that Williams Act protects shareholders, but key mandate of Williams Act is neutrality
between target corporation management, shareholders, and tender offeror, not shareholder pro-
tection).
70. Compare CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1645-46 with supra notes 31-34, 55, 56, 69 and
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The CTS Court found that the Indiana Act allows shareholders, voting
as a group, to decide whether the tender offeror gets voting rights in the
target corporation.
71
The Supreme Court determined that the shareholders' ability to act as
a group in the corporation's best interests in deciding whether to accept
or reject a takeover bid was essential to furthering the Williams Act's goal
of giving equal communicative power to the target corporation's manage-
ment and the tender offeror. 72 The Court determined that a key factor in
matching the goals of the Williams Act to the provisions of the Indiana
Act is that the Indiana Act, by giving neither the target corporation's
management nor the tender offeror an advantage over the other in com-
municating with shareholders regarding an impending offer, allows share-
holders to receive full information from both sides before deciding whether
to sell stock in the target corporation. 73 Additionally, the CTS Court
concluded that the Williams Act could not preempt the Indiana Act since
the Indiana Act allowed shareholders to vote as a group and thus, the
Indiana Act protects the shareholders from potentially coercive tender
offers .74
After determining that the Williams Act did not preempt the Indiana
Act, the Supreme Court in CTS considered whether the Indiana Act
violated the commerce clause in article I of the United States Constitu-
tion. 7s Specifically, the Court scrutinized the Indiana Act to see if the Act
discriminated against interstate commerce or adversely affected interstate
commerce by subjecting out-of-state corporations to regulations potentially
inconsistent with other state regulations. 76 Under the terms of the Indiana
Act, a target corporation, to fall within the coverage of the Indiana Act,
must meet several requirements. 77 The target corporation must be incor-
accompanying text ( MITE Court plurality focuses on neutrality between target corporation
management, shareholders, and tender offeror, while CTS Court relies on shareholder protection
to carry forth Williams Act goals).
71. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1646; see IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (Bums Supp. 1988)
(shareholders acting as group can reject offer although individual shareholders might be inclined
to accept tender offer).
72. Compare CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1646 with supra notes 31-34, 55, 56, 69 and accompanying
text ( MITE Court plurality focuses on neutrality between target corporation management,
shareholders, and tender offeror while CTS Court relies on shareholder protection to carry forth
Williams Act goals).
73. Id.; see Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 31-35 (1977) (purpose of Williams Act
is to protect shareholders confronted with tender offer, and to prohibit target corporation
management or tender offeror from gaining advantage in communicating with shareholders).
74. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1646-48.
75. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1648, see U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (prohibiting states from
interfering with interstate commerce and giving Congress full power to regulate commerce between
states).
76. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1648-52; see Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36-37
(1980) (legitimate state statute that burdens interstate commerce also must confer potential benefits
on local interests).
77. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (discussing qualifications that target
corporation must have for Indiana Act to apply to corporation).
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porated in Indiana 8 and have at least one hundred shareholders.7 9 Addi-
tionally, the target corporation must have its principal place of business,
its principal offices, or some substantial assets in Indiana. 8° Finally, more
than ten percent of the target corporation's shareholders must reside in
Indiana, Indiana residents must own more than ten percent of its shares,
or at least ten thousand of the target corporation's shareholders must
reside in Indiana."' In scrutinizing the Indiana Act's potential burden on
interstate commerce, the Court recognized that every state has enacted
laws regulating corporate activities. 82 The Court determined that since the
Indiana Act applied not only to shareholders in Indiana but also in other
states, the Indiana Act impacted upon interstate commerce.8 3 The Court
maintained, however, that the Indiana Act did not discriminate against
interstate commerce since nonresident shareholders received the same status
in relation to the target corporation's management and the tender offeror
that the resident shareholders received. 84 Additionally, the Court in CTS
recognized that Indiana has a legitimate state interest in regulating internal
corporate affairs of corporations that the state of Indiana charters.8 5 While
the Court recognized that a state has no interest in protecting nonresident
shareholders of foreign corporations8 6 the Court asserted that, since the
Indiana. Act only pertains to corporations that are incorporated in Indiana
and that have substantial ties to Indiana, the Indiana Act's primary
purpose is to protect the shareholders of Indiana corporations.8 7 The Court
determined that the Indiana Act would not hinder tender offers in Indiana
since the control share provisions in the Indiana Act that regulate voting
78. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-17-3, 23-1-20-5 (Burns Supp. 1988) (Indiana Act only applies
to corporations incorporated in Indiana).
79. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4 (Burns Supp. 1988) (corporation subject to provisions of
Act must have at least one hundred shareholders).
80. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4 (Burns Supp. 1988) (corporation subject to provisions of
Act must have substantial ties to Indiana).
81. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4 (Burns Supp. 1988) (substantial number of shareholders
owning stock in target corporation must reside in Indiana for target corporation to become subject
to Act).
82. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1649-51.
83. Id. at 1649-52. While the Supreme Court in CTS recognized that the Indiana Act
necessarily impacts upon both Indiana resident shareholders and nonresident shareholders, the
Court recognized that each application of the Indiana Act would affect a substantial number of
Indiana residents. Id. at 1652; see supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (discussing corporations
subject to provisions of Indiana Act). The CTS Court concluded that because the Indiana Act
focuses primarily on Indiana corporations, shareholders, and residents, Indiana has a legitimate
interest in protecting those Indiana constituents. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1652.
84. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
85. Id.; see supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing Court's recognition in CTS
that each state has right to regulate internal corporate affairs of domestic corporations).
86. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1651; see Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-44 (1982)
(although state has legitimate interest in protecting local resident shareholders, state has no interest
in protecting nonresident shareholders).
87. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1651.
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rights only attempt to protect shareholders.8 8 The Court in CTS asserted
that Indiana only needed to provide that residents and nonresidents have
equal access to Indiana corporation securities and receive equal treatment
in tender offers. 89 Finally, the Supreme Court in CTS concluded that no
significant detriment exists to interstate commerce if each state regulates
voting rights only in the businesses incorporated in that state.90
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in CTS, state and federal courts
consistently struck down as unconstitutional state regulation of takeover
attempts. 9' The CTS decision, however, legitimizes state involvement in
tender offer regulation, at least to the extent that a state statute is similar
to the Indiana Act.92 The CTS decision increases the likelihood that second
generation state tender offer legislation, as well as new state takeover
legislation formulated as corporate governance statutes, 93 passed after the
CTS decision, may be found constitutional. 94 To be constitutional under
88. Id. at 1652.
89. Id. In CTS the Court reasoned that since corporations themselves are created and defined
by state law, states do not have to define tender offers as other states define tender offers. Id.
Under a commerce clause analysis, the court concluded, a state need only provide equal access to
its corporations to all potential shareholders. Id.
90. Id. at 1649.
91. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (discussing uniform state and federal court
rejection of state takeover statutes after MITE).
92. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1652; see supra notes 46-90 and accompanying text (discussing CTS
Court's review and approval of Indiana Act under Williams Act preemption inquiry and commerce
clause analysis).
93. See infra notes 99-123 and accompanying text (discussing state statutes drafted and
enacted after Supreme Court's approval of Indiana Act in CTS), supra note 21 and accompanying
text (discussing state business combination statutes).
94. See S. PAmEpiNTo, supra note 7, at 42 (discussing state statutes that lower federal courts
invalidated after MITE, but that may be valid under CTS rationale); supra notes 13-15 and
accompanying text (discussing judicial disapproval of second generation legislation based upon
Supreme Court's reasoning in MITE). In Terry v. Yamashita, for example, the United States
District Court for the District of Hawaii invalidated Hawaii's second generation control share
acquisitions statute before the Supreme court in CTS determined that the Indiana Act was valid.
Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Haw. 1986); see infra note 99 and accompanying
text (discussing Hawaii's control share legislation). The Hawaii legislature, however, repealed the
control share provision in Hawaii's statute prior to the Supreme Court's decision in CTS. HAw.
Rav. STAT. § 416-171 (1985), repealed by L. 1987, c. 135, § 208; infra note 99 and accompanying
text (discussing specifics of Hawaii control share provisions prior to repeal by legislature).
Like Hawaii's control share statute, Ohio's control share legislation was invalidated prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in CTS. Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742,
754-56 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 1623 (1987). Six days
after deciding CTS, the Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit's ruling invalidating the Ohio
control share statute and ordered the Sixth Circuit court to reconsider the control share provision
in light of CTS. Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 107 S. Ct. 1623 (1987). On remand the
Sixth Circuit expressed no opinion regarding the constitutionality of the Ohio control share statute
and remanded the dispute to the district court for the determination of whether the constitutionality
question had been mooted by completion of the merger between the parties. Fleet Aerospace
Corp. v. Holderman, 848 F.2d 720, 723-24 (6th Cir. 1988). See supra note 13 and accompanying
text (discussing Sixth Circuit's invalidation of Ohio control share provision prior to Supreme
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the rationale of MITE and CTS, however, state takeover legislation must
apply only to corporations in the regulating state. 95 In addition, the CTS
decision allows only shareholders, not state agencies and possibly not
target corporation management, to rule ultimately on the merits of a
tender offer. 96 Furthermore, under the rationale of MITE and CTS, a
state cannot allow a target corporation indefinitely to delay a tender
offer's completion. 97 Finally, under CTS the objective of valid state tender
offer legislation must be to protect shareholders and must not favor either
the target corporation's management or a tender offeror. 9
Control Share Statutes
Since the Supreme Court in CTS concluded that the Indiana Act was
constitutional, many states have adopted control share statutes that are
nearly identical to the Indiana Act in that the control share provisions
allow a target corporation's shareholders to grant the voting rights of
controlling shares of the target corporation's stock to a tender offeror
who acquires those shares. 99 Not all states, however, have adopted the
Court's decision in CTS); supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing CRTF Corp. v.
Federated Dep't Stores, in which the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
found constitutional Ohio provision calling for public disclosure prior to commencement of tender
offer), infra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing validity of Ohio Act in light of Veere,
Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.).
95. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1651; see also IN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-17-3, 23-1-20-5, 23-1-42-4
(Bums Supp. 1988) (Indiana Act only applies to corporations incorporated under Indiana Law).
96. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1646; see also IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (Burns Supp. 1988)
(providing that only vote of shareholders can grant control share voting rights to acquiring party).
See notes 68-72 and accompanying text (indicating that target corporation management may have
authority to judge merits of tender offer if shareholder protection is key to Williams Act).
97. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1646. See generally supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing
Williams Act's general time requirements in tender offer process).
98. Id. But see supra notes 31-34, 55, 56, 59 and accompanying text (discussing MITE
Court's plurality's recognition that Williams Act only mandates neutrality between shareholders,
target corporation management, and tender offeror).
99. See:
HAWAII
Hawaii's control share statute (the Hawaii Act), repealed in 1987, was nearly identical to the
Indiana Act. See supra notes 46-88 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Indiana Act).
Like the Indiana Act, the Hawaii Act applied to all target corporations that had at least one
hundred shareholders and were incorporated in Hawaii. HAw. Rv. STAT. § 416-171 (1985),
repealed by L. 1987, c. 135, § 208. The target corporation also had to have either its principal
place of business in Hawaii or substantial assets located in Hawaii to have been subject to the
provisions of the Hawaii Act. Id. In addition, the control share ownership levels requiring majority
shareholder approval of voting rights were ten percent, twenty percent, forty percent, and a
majority of the outstanding shares. HAw. Ray. CODE § 416-172 (1985), repealed by L. 1987, c.
135, § 208. The disclosure statement under the Hawaii Act required more information than the
Indiana Act requires. Id.; see supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing requirements
of Indiana disclosure statement). Furthermore, the special shareholder meeting, demanded by the
tender offeror, called in order for the shareholders to vote on whether to confer control share
voting rights upon the tender offeror, had to occur within fifty-five days after the target
corporation's management received the information statement. HAw. REv. CODE § 416-172(1985),
repealed by L. 1987, c. 135, § 208; see supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing District
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exact language of the Indiana Act."00 Numerous states, although utilizing
control share provisions, have modified the Indiana Act to include share-
holder notice provisions that are more rigorous than the Indiana Act's
notice provisions. 10' For example, after the CTS decision, the Arizona
Court for District of Hawaii's invalidation of Hawaii Act prior to repeal of Act by Hawaii
legislature and Supreme Court's decision in CTS).
LOUISIANA
In 1987 Louisiana enacted a state takeover statute that is substantially similar to the Indiana
Act. LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:135-:140.2 (West 1988); see supra notes 46-90 and accompanying
text (discussing Indiana Act provisions).
Omo
Ohio was the first state to try to tailor its control share acquisition statute to meet the
concerns of the Supreme Court in MITE. See S. Pammpwro, supra note 7, at 13-15 (discussing
Ohio's leading role in responding to MITE in enacting takeover legislation); Orno REv. CODE
ANN. § 1701.831 (Baldwin 1986 & Supp. 1987), § 1701.832 (Baldwin 1986) (containing provisions
of Ohio control share statute); supra notes 25-40 and accompanying text (discussing Court's
decision in MITE). Ohio passed its takeover statute (Ohio Act) six months after the Supreme
Court's decision in MITE. Omo REv. CODE § 1701.831 (Baldwin 1986 & Supp. 1987), § 1701.832
(Baldwin 1986). The Indiana legislature closely followed the provisions of the Ohio model four
years later in drafting the Indiana Act. See supra notes 46-88 and accompanying text (discussing
provisions of Indiana Act); infra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing districtcourt's analysis
in Veere, Inc. v. Firestone 77re & Rubber Co., comparing Indiana Act's provisions with provisions
of Ohio Act). To become subject to the terms of the Ohio Act, a target corporation must be
incorporated in Ohio, must have fifty or more shareholders, and must have its principal place of
business, principal executive officer, or substantial assets within Ohio. Omo REv. CODE ANN. §
1701.831 (Baldwin 1986 & Supp. 1987). The only significant, yet important, difference between
the Ohio Act and the Indiana Act is that, under the Ohio Act, a majority of shareholders and a
majority of disinterested shareholders must approve the tender offeror's purchase of the control
shares instead of, as under the Indiana Act, approve granting the bidder voting rights with those
shares. Id.; see supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (discussing Indiana Act's meeting
requirements and manner in which shareholders convey voting rights upon acquiring party); see
also supra notes 13, 32, 94, 115 and accompanying text (discussing judicial activity, both prior to
and subsequent to CTS, regarding Ohio's control shares legislation);- supra notes% 32, 94 and
accompanying text (discussing validity, as determined by District Court for Southern District of
Ohio, of Ohio provision mandating public disclosure of tender offer prior to commencement of
tender offer).
OREGON
Oregon's version of the Indiana Act became effective on August 1, 1987. OR. REv. STAT. §
60.131, 60.787 (1987). Under the Oregon takeover statute (Oregon Act) only corporations incor-
porated within Oregon that have at least one hundred shareholders and that consider Oregon as
their principal place of business qualify for protection. Id. Unlike the Indiana Act, however, the
Oregon Act has a sunset provision under which the Oregon Act will expire on December 31, 1989.
Id.
UTAH
Utah's Control Shares Acquisitions Act (Utah Act) became effective on May 29, 1987. UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 61-6-1 to -12 (Supp. 1988). The provisions of the Utah Act are substantially similar
to the Indiana Act. Id.; see supra notes 46-90 and accompanying text (discussing Indiana Act's
provisions).
100. See infra notes 101-123 and accompanying text (discussing control share acquisition
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state legislature enacted a control share provision (Arizona Act) that
On July 22, 1987, Arizona amended its corporate laws to include a control share acquisitions
provision. AIz. RE . STAT. AN-N. §§ 10-1211 to -1217 (Supp. 1987). Although Arizona's control
share acquisitions statute contains most of the disclosure requirements of the Indiana Act, the
Arizona statute also contains several additional requirements. Am. REv. STAT. AN. §§ 10-1211
to -1217 (Supp. 1987); see infra notes 102-106 and accompanying text (discussing Arizona's
additional notice requirements that go beyond requirements of the Indiana Act), infra note 115
and accompanying text (discussing Arizona's attempt to include foreign corporations within its
control share provisions).
MINNESOTA
Minnesota adopted a control share takeover statute (Minnesota Act) on June 25, 1987. MiNN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.011, 302A.671 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988). While the Minnesota Act contains
most of the disclosure requirements that the Indiana Act contains, the Minnesota Act also contains
several additional disclosure standards. Compare MiN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1988) (detailing information that offerer must include in information statement) with IND.
CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-6 (Burns Supp. 1988) (detailing specific information that offerer must include
in notice of control share acquisitions). The disclosure information statement that the Minnesota
Act re4uires demands more information than the Indiana model, including, for example, financial
arrangements and plans or proposals to sell assets of the target corporation, plans to change the
location of a material portion of the target corporation's operations, and plans to make virtually
any change in the target corporation's structure. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1988). For a corporation to qualify for protection under the Minnesota Act, a target
corporation either must have at least fifty shareholders and have its principal executive office in
Minnesota or must own or control assets in Minnesota that have a fair market value of at least
one million dollars. MwN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.011 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988). Additionally,
before the Minnesota Act will apply to regulate a tender offer, more than ten percent of the
target corporation's shareholders must reside in Minnesota, Minnesota residents must own more
than ten percent of its shares, or more than one thousand of the target corporation's shareholders
must reside in Minnesota. Id. In addition to those provisions that are similar to Indiana Act
provisions, the Minnesota Act also includes a provision concerning the tender offeror's financial
arrangements for the proposed takeover. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West 1985 & Supp.
1988). Prior to the special shareholder meeting, which must be called by the target corporation's
management within fifty-five days of the management's receipt of the information statement, the
tender offeror must submit financing agreements with financial institutions to show that the tender
offeror has financial sources with which to initiate and complete the proposed purchase. Id.
MissouRI
Missouri amended its control share acquisition provisions (Missouri Act) in 1987 to parallel
the statute to the Indiana Act. Mo. AIN. STAT. §§ 351.015-.407 (Vernon Supp. 1988); see supra
notes 46-90 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Indiana Act that Supreme Court
specifically approved in CTS). The Missouri Act protects corporations incorporated under Missouri
law that have their principal place of business, principal office, or substantial assets within
Missouri. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.015 (Vernon Supp. 1988). For a Missouri corporation to qualify
under the Missouri Act, more than ten percent of the corporation's shareholders must reside in
Missouri, Missouri residents must own more than ten percent of its shares, or at least ten thousand
shareholders of the corporation must reside in Missouri. Id. The disclosure statement that tender
offeror of a target corporation must prepare under the Missouri Act essentially mirrors the Indiana
Act's disclosure requirements. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1988); see IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-1-42-6 (Bums Supp. 1988) (setting forth details that Indiana Act's notice of control
share acquisition requires). In contrast to the Indiana Act, however, the tender offerer must obtain
an affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of all outstanding shares entitled to vote before the
tender offerer can gain voting rights in the control shares acquired. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.407
(Vernon 1987); see IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (Bums Supp. 1988) (requiring majority vote of
disinterested shareholders to approve control share acquisition). The Missouri Act also gives
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embodies the basic requirements of the Indiana Act. 0 2 Unlike the Indiana
Act, however, the Arizona Act requires a tender offeror to include the
specific financial arrangements of the tender offer in the tender offeror's
notice to the target corporation and the corporation's shareholders.0 3 The
Arizona Act sets forth that the tender offeror must disclose plans or
proposals to sell assets of the target corporation, plans to change the
location of a material portion of the corporation, and plans to make
changes in the target corporation's structure.0 4 Under the Arizona Act,
completion of the disclosure statement and tender offeror's request for a
shareholder meeting is insufficient to call the shareholder meeting that
may grant voting rights to the tender offeror's shares. 05 The tender offeror,
in addition to the disclosure statement and request for a shareholder
meeting, also must deliver to the target corporation definitive financing
agreements with one or more financial institutions, indicating that the
tender offeror will not sell the assets of the target corporation to help
finance the tender offeror's acquisition of the shares. 0 6 Statutes like the
extensive rights to a shareholder who dissents from a successful control share acquisition, including
the right to demand that the corporation buy back the shareholder's shares at some fair price to
be agreed upon by the parties. Mo. STAT. ANN. § 351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
NEVADA
Like the Indiana Act, the Nevada Takeover Act (Nevada Act) provides that a majority of a
target corporation's shareholders must grant, by vote, the voting rights of shares acquired that
give the tender offeror twenty percent, thirty-three percent, or fifty-one percent of the target
corporation's shares. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (discussing control share
acquisition provision of Indiana Act); NEv. Ray. STAT. §§ 78.3785, 78.3791 (Mitchie 1987)
(containing control share provisions of Nevada Act). The disclosure provisions of the Nevada Act
are similar to the disclosure requirements of the Indiana Act. Compare NEV. RaV. STAT. §§
78.376-78.3793 (Mitchie 1987) (containing provisions of Nevada Act) with supra notes 47-90 and
accompanying text (discussing disclosure provisions of Indiana Act). Additionally, the Nevada Act
only applies to offeree corporations, defined by the Nevada Act as corporations incorporated
under Nevada law whose shares are the subject of a takeover bid. NEV. REv. STAT. § 78.3765
(Mitchie 1987). In Batus, Inc. v. McKey the Federal District Court for the District of Nevada
invalidated the Nevada Act by concluding that the Williams Act preempted the Nevada Act's
requirement that shareholders only had sixty days to tender their shares to the offerer. Batus, Inc.
v. McKey, 684 F. Supp. 637, 639-40 (D. Nev. 1988); see supra notes 6, 29, 34 and accompanying
text (discussing Williams Act provisions and recognizing that goal of Williams Act is to allow
shareholders alone to make investment decisions given mandated disclosure); see also 17 C.F.R. §
240.14d-7 (1988) (setting forth that there is no limit on how long offer may remain open to
shareholders under vrilliams Act).
102. Compare ARtiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1211 to -1217 (Supp. 1987) (containing Arizona's
control share provisions) with supra notes 47-90 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of
Indiana Act).
103. Atiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1214 (Supp. 1987). Under the terms of the Arizona control
share legislation, the special shareholder meeting regarding the issuance of control share voting
rights cannot proceed unless the tender offeror delivers to the target corporation definitive financing
agreements with financial institutions regarding the proposed tender offer. Id.
104. Asiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-1212 (Supp. 1987).
105. Aaiz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 10-1214 (Supp. 1987).
106. Id.; see supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text (discussing financial reporting items
that tender offeror must include in information statement).
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Arizona Act, which add more rigorous shareholder notice requirements
than the Indiana Act, will most likely be found to be constitutional despite
difficulties under the CTS preemptive test. 7
In the Supreme Court's Williams Act preemptive test analysis in CTS
the court concluded that the primary purpose of the Williams Act is to
protect shareholders from target corporation management and tender
offerors.10 Although notice requirements generally help protect sharehold-
ers from fraudulent or inadequate tender offer disclosure, state control
share legislation notice requirements may be so extensive that the require-
ments actually operate to the shareholders' detriment. 0 9 If the increased
notice requirements actually deter tender offers, or at least delay tender
offers, that deterrent effect may outweigh the benefits accruing to share-
holders from increased disclosure." 0 For example, the Williams Act re-
quires that a tender offeror disclose the tender offeror's intent in purchasing
shares whenever the tender offeror obtains more than five percent of a
107. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing Williams Act's notice requirements);
supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing CTS Court's recognition that state desire to
protect shareholders may be consistent with intent of Williams Act).
108. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1645 (1987). But see Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 30 (1977) (basic purpose of Williams Act is to place shareholders
on equal footing with bidder initiating tender offer); supra notes 31-34, 55, 56, 69 (discussing
MITE Court plurality's recognition that Williams Act only mandates neutrality between share-
holders, target corporation management, and tender offeror).-
109. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 634-640 (1982) (discussing William Act's
preemption of Illinois takeover statute). In MITE the Illinois Act required a tender offeror to
notify the Secretary of State of Illinois of its intent to make a tender offer and of the material
terms of the offer twenty days before the offer became effective. MITE, 457 U.S. at 634-35; see
Ia. Ray. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.54 E,B (Smith-Hurd 1979) (repealed) (requiring bidder to
give advance notice of tender offer). The Supreme Court expressed concern that during the twenty-
day advance period, the target corporation would be free to disseminate information to its
shareholders concerning the impending tender offer. MITE, 457 U.S. at 635. The Court in MITE
recognized that Congress, in enacting the Williams Act, specifically had rejected tender offer
precommencement notification proposals that closely paralleled the notification requirements in
the Illinois Act. Id. at 636; see H.R. 4285, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (rejecting proposed lengthy
period between notice to target corporation and target corporation's shareholders and commence-
ment of tender offer). The Supreme Court in MITE cautioned that by allowing the target
corporation additional time to take steps to combat a takeover offer, the notification requirement
would provide a target corporation's management with an advantage over the tender offeror.
MiTE, 457 U.S. at 635. In addition, the Court in MITE expressed concern that provisions which
allow a target corporation's management indefinitely to delay a tender offer beyond the period
the Williams Act mandates would provide target corporation's management with an advantage
over the tender offeror. Id. at 637; supra notes 31-34, 55, 56 and accompanying text (discussing
MITE Court plurality's view that neither target corporation management nor tender offeror at
advantage with each other); see supra notes 6, 99 and accompanying text (discussing time restraints
on duration of tender offer under Williams Act).
110. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 634-36 (1982) (discussing shareholders' right
to pursue tender offer without unreasonable delay in light of Illinois Act's notification requirements
that effectively delayed start of tender offer); H.R. 4285, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (Congress
rejects precommencement notification proposal during deliberation on 1970 amendments to Williams
Act); infra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing Massachusetts Act's pre-tender offer notice
requirement that First Circuit invalidated as interfering with Williams Act notice requirements).
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corporation's shares."' At the five percent threshold point, Congress
determined, shareholders benefitted from the information disclosed and,
at the same time, the disclosure requirement did not deter bidders from
making tender offers." 2 Courts must scrutinize the goals of the Williams
Act in reviewing state control share statutes, like the Arizona Act, that
provide shareholders with protection beyond the protection that the In-
diana Act provides." 3 Even though states have an interest in protecting
shareholders of their corporations, that protection must be consistent with
the provisions of Williams Act.'
14
While some states have modified the notice provisions mandated by
the Williams Act, other states have adopted control share statutes that
differ from the Indiana Act by including foreign corporations operating
in the states within the control share provisions." 5 For example, North
111. Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982).
112. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 634-36 (1982) (finding legislative intent that
specific notice requirement at five percent ownership level represents point at which notification
does not deter tender offers, yet provides shareholders with sufficient information regarding
potential bid); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 28-31 (1977) (recognizing that shareholder
needs Congressional protection to ensure that shareholders receive full and fair disclosure from
tender offeror).
113. See supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text (discussing Court's inquiries in MITE and
CTS into relationship between state takeover statutes and intent and policies behind Williams Act);
note 6 and accompanying text (discussing procedural requirements of Williams Act).
114. See supra notes 28-35, 47-74 and accompanying text (discussing Court's mandate in
MITE and CTS that states' protection of shareholders can not conflict with procedural requirements
under Williams Act); note 101 and accompanying text (discussing district court's finding of
unconstitutionality of Nevada Act because bid must be completed within sixty days while Williams
Act mandates limitless time period for completion of tender offer).
115. See:
ArIzoNA
Arizona's control shares provisions extend to corporations that are not incorporated in
Arizona, but that have assets of at least one million dollars located in Arizona and have more
than five hundred employees who are Arizona residents. Ariz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 10-1201 (Supp.
1987); see supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text (discussing additional notice requirement
features beyond foreign corporation inclusion in Act); note 101 and accompanying text (discussing
Arizona's control share legislation generally).
FLORIDA
After the Supreme Court approved the Indiana Act in CTS, Florida adopted a control share
statute (Florida Act) that is substantially similar to the Indiana Act. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 607.109 (West Supp. 1988) (Florida Act) with IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to 23-1-42-11 (Burns
Supp. 1988) (Indiana Act). The Florida legislature, however, changed the number of resident
shareholders that a target corporation must have to qualify under the Act from ten thousand to
one thousand. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.109 (West Supp. 1988); see IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4
(Burns Supp. 1988) (for issuing corporation to qualify under Indiana Act, ten thousand shareholders
of corporation must reside in Indiana). The Florida Act also contains provisions that bring some
foreign corporations within the Florida Act's jurisdiction. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.110 (West Supp.
1988). To be subject to the requirements of the Florida Act, a foreign corporation must have
authority to do business in Florida and have more than one hundred shareholders. Id. Additionally,
the foreign corporation must have its principal place of business, its principal office, or substantial
assets in Florida. Id. Furthermore, a foreign corporation must have more than five hundred
Florida residents as employees and a gross annual payroll to Florida residents of more than five
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Carolina enacted a control share statute (North Carolina Act) that applies
million dollars. Id. Finally, for the foreign corporation to be subject to the Florida Act, the
corporation must have more than ten percent of its shareholders residing in Florida, or more than
ten percent of its shares owned by Florida residents, or more than one thousand shareholders that
are Florida residents. Id. The Florida Act is, however, inapplicable to foreign corporations that
otherwise may qualify under the Act if the laws of the foreign corporation's state of incorporation
are expressly inconsistent with the Florida Act. Id.
MASSACHUSEMrS
Massachusetts' control share acquisitions legislation (Massachusetts Act) applies to domestic
corporations and parallels closely the Indiana Act. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 110D, §§ 1-8 (West
1987); see supra notes 47-90 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Indiana Act).
In addition to protecting domestic corporations, the Massachusetts control shares provisions protect
foreign corporations that meet several conditions. MAss. Gm. LAws ANN. ch. 110E, § I (West
1987). First, for a foreign corporation to qualify for protection under the Massachusetts Act, the
corporation must have more than two hundred shareholders, its executive offices in Massachusetts,
and more employees or more capital assets in Massachusetts than in any other state. Id.
Additionally, for the foreign corporation to qualify under the Massachusetts Act, more than ten
percent of the foreign corporation's shareholders must reside in Massachusetts, or Massachusetts'
residents must own more than ten percent of the foreign corporation's stock. Id.
In addition to the Massachusetts Act's inclusion of foreign corporations within the Act's
provisions, the Massachusetts Act also varies significantly from the Indiana Act in that the Act
provides that tender offerors that fail to disclose their intent to bid for a target corporation and
still accumulate five percent of the target corporation's stock may not make a bid for that target
corporation until one year after the failure to disclose. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110C, § 3
(West 1987). In Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit determined that the disclosure provision of the Massachusetts Act may violate
the United States Constitution, and additionally that the Williams Act probably preempts the
disclosure section. Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 843-53 (1st Cir.1988).
The court concluded that the notice requirements of section 3 of chapter 110C burdened interstate
commerce to a degree that exceeded the local benefits that the notice provisions conferred on
Massachusetts shareholders. Id. at 844-48; see MAss. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 110C, § 3 (West 1987)
(mandating precommencement notice disclosure to target company). Additionally, the First Circuit
concluded that section 3 of chapter 1100 intruded upon the disclosure requirements of the Williams
Act. Hyde Park Partners, 839 F.2d at 853.
NoRTH CAROUINA
North Carolina adopted a modified version of the Indiana Act on August 12, 1987. N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 55-90 to -98.1 (1987); see supra notes 47-90 and accompanying text (discussing
provisions of Indiana Act). The North Carolina control shares provisions (North Carolina Act)
apply to target corporations that are incorporated under North Carolina law and that have
substantial assets in North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90 (1987). For a North Carolina
corporation to qualify for coverage under the North Carolina Act, the corporation must have five
hundred or more shareholders. Id. Second, the corporation must have its principal place of
business or principal office in North Carolina. Id. Finally, more than ten percent of the
corporation's shareholders must reside in North Carolina or North Carolina residents must own
more than ten percent of the corporation's shares. Id. In addition to protecting North Carolina
corporations, the North Carolina Act also applies to foreign corporations that meet one of two
criteria. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90 (1987). First, a foreign corporation that has more than'forty
percent of the corporation's American assets located in North Carolina comes within the provisions
of the North Carolina Act. Id. Alternatively, for a foreign corporation to qualify for coverage
under the North Carolina Act, more than forty percent of the foreign corporation's workforce in
the United States must be North Carolina residents. Id. The North Carolina Act, however, is
inapplicable to foreign corporations that otherwise qualify under the North Carolina Act if the
laws of the state in which the foreign corporation is incorporated are inconsistent with the North
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to foreign corporations that either have located in North Carolina more
than forty percent of their fixed assets in the United States or have North
Carolina residents comprising more than forty percent of the corporation's
United States workforce. 1 6 The Court in CTS expressly warned that state
takeover legislation that applied to foreign corporations could restrict
interstate commerce unconstitutionally.1 7 Some states, however, have as-
serted that foreign corporations may have a substantial nexus with a
Carolina Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-96 (1987). Finally, the North Carolina Act contains a
severability clause which states that the invalidity of any individual provision of the North Carolina
Act will not invalidate the other provisions of the Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-97 (1987).
OMO
Ohio adopted its control shares provisions (Ohio Act) before Indiana adopted its Act. See
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Baldwin 1986 & Supp. 1987), § 1701.832 (Baldwin 1986)
(containing provisions of Ohio's control shares section of Ohio takeover legislation); supra note
99 and accompanying text (discussing Ohio Act). The Ohio Act parallels the Indiana Act, except
that under the terms of the Ohio Act, the tender offeror cannot receive the control shares
themselves unless the shareholders vote to approve the acquisition. Owio REv. CODE ANN. §
1701.831 (Baldwin 1986 & Supp. 1987); see IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (Bums Supp. 1988)
(under terms of Indiana Act, shareholders vote to give control shares voting rights). In Veere Inc.
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
scrutinized the provisions of the Ohio Act and upheld the Act as constitutional in relation to the
goals of Williams Act and the commerce clause. Veere Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 685
F. Supp. 1027, 1029, 1033 (N.D. Ohio 1988). The Veere court concluded that the Ohio Act
provision that requires a tender offeror to hold open the tender for longer than the minimum
period provided by the Williams Act was not preempted by the Williams Act, since the provision
allowed shareholders to collectively mandate the fairness of the tender offer and vote as a group.
Id. at 1031-32. Under the court's commerce clause analysis, of utmost importance for constitutional
validity was the text that the Ohio Act applies only to domestic corporations located within Ohio.
Id. at 1033. Cf. n.120 and accompanying text (Ohio Foreign Business Acquisition Act struck
down by District Court for Southern District of Ohio because out-of-state corporations subject to
potentially inconsistent Ohio provisions). See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing
additional analysis upholding Ohio provision that mandates disclosure of tender offer to target
corporation prior to commencement of tender offer).
In February 1988 Ohio amended the Ohio Act to include foreign corporations within the
Ohio Act's jurisdiction. See Sub. S.B. 359, 1988 Ohio Legis. Serv. S 283 § I (creating §§ 1710.01-
05 of Ohio Code); infra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing court decision invalidating
Ohio Act's provision allowing foreign corporations to take advantage of legislation).
OKLHOMA
The Oklahoma Control Shares Acquisition Act (Oklahoma Act) adopted the essential provi-
sions of the Indiana Act. OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1145-1155 (West 1987); see supra notes 46-
88 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Indiana Act). Unlike the Indiana Act, however,
the Oklahoma Act applies to any corporation with one hundred or more shareholders, its principal
place of business or substantial assets in Oklahoma, and ten percent of its shareholders residing
in Oklahoma. OKiA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1148 (West 1987); see supra notes 47-90 and
accompanying text (discussing provisions of Indiana Act). Thus, a foreign corporation may be
subject to the Oklahoma Act if more than ten percent of the foreign corporation's shareholders
reside in Oklahoma, Oklahoma residents must own more than ten percent of the corporation's
stock, or additionally, ten thousand shareholders must reside in Oklahoma. OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 1148 (West 1987); see infra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing court decision
invalidating Oklahoma's inclusion of foreign corporations in Oklahoma Act).
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-90 (1987).
117. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1651-52 (1987).
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controlling state and that the state, therefore, has a sufficient interest in
protecting resident shareholders and, in turn, effectively regulating nation-
wide tender offers." 8 The Supreme Court in MITE and CTS, however,
recognized that state takeover legislation could not burden out-of-state
transactions by applying to both in-state and out-of-state corporations." 9
Statutes that apply to foreign corporations directly can regulate and
potentially may prevent interstate tender offers. 20 North Carolina and
other states that include foreign corporations within their takeover legis-
lation, however, have attempted to draft their statutes so that the statutes
do not unconstitutionally interfere with interstate commerce.' 2' Under the
North Carolina Act, for example, a foreign corporation that is incorpo-
rated in a state that has a corporate takeover statute that differs from the
North Carolina Act is exempted from the North Carolina Act's provi-
sions. 22 As a further safety, states attempting to bring foreign corporations
within their control share legislation may add severability clauses to the
statutes to ensure that the sections mirroring the Indiana Act remain free
from judicial scrutiny.'
23
Because most states that have enacted control share statutes like the
Indiana Act either have adopted language that is similar to the Indiana
Act's language or have included provisions that protect the statutes from
invalidity, most control share statutes appear to be constitutional under
the rationale of the Court in CTS.'2 For state takeover statutes to survive
judicial scrutiny, however, the statutes must further the goals of the
Williams Act. 25 Although states have an interest in protecting shareholders
118. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text (discussing state statutes that include
foreign corporations within control share provisions).
119. See supra notes 37-41, 84-90 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
determination in MITE and CTS that state takeover legislation, in order to not unconstitutionally
burden interstate commerce, cannot apply to both in-state and out-of-state corporations).
120. See, e.g., Campeau Corp. v. Federated Dept. Stores, 679 F. Supp. 735, 739 (S.D. Ohio
1988) (Ohio Foreign Business Acquisition Act discriminates against foreign commerce and burdens
interstate commerce by creating risk of inconsistent state regulation); TLX Acquisition Corp. v.
Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022, 1029-34 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (invalidating Oklahoma statute that
applied control shares provisions to foreign corporations even where state could show substantial
nexus between foreign corporations and Oklahoma since Court concluded state had no interest in
protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident corporations).
121. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing provisions exempting foreign
corporations from control share provisions if competing state laws exist as to tender offers); see
also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.110 (West Supp. 1988) (exempting foreign corporation from Florida's
control share provisions if competing state laws exist); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-96 (1987) (if foreign
corporation's state of incorporation has competing tender offer regulations, foreign corporation,
otherwise subject to terms of North Carolina Act, is not subject to terms of North Carolina Act).
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-96 (1987).
123. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing North Carolina Act's severability
clause); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-97 (1987) (providing that invalidity of individual provisions
of North Carolina Act will not affect validity of other provisions).
124. See supra notes 47-90 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's determination
that Indiana Act is constitutional under Williams Act and commerce clause).
125. See supra notes 54-74 and accompanying text (discussing CTS Court's recognition of
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of their corporations, this protection cannot interfere with other states'
rights to organize and protect their own corporations and shareholders.1
26
As state legislative attempts begin to differ from the type of state takeover
statute that the Supreme Court upheld in CTS, courts will analyze new
state takeover legislation, like fair price statutes and freezeout laws,
according to the two-part scrutiny that the MITE and CTS Courts man-
dated. 27 State attempts at regulating takeovers must not interfere with the
purposes of the Williams Act and cannot unjustly discriminate against
interstate commerce. 2 The tests to be applied under a Williams Act
preemption analysis and commerce clause violation inquiry may not be
entirely well-defined, though, based upon the subtle inconsistencies between
the MITE and CTS decisions.
29
Fair Price Statutes
Numerous states have adopted a form of second generation takeover
legislation referred to as fair price statutes. 110 Unlike control share statutes,
importance of Williams Act in regulating tender offers); supra notes 28-35, 54-74 and accompanying
text (discussing need for state legislation to coexist with Williams Act).
126. See supra notes 36-41, 75-90 and accompanying text (state takeover legislation cannot
interfere with interstate commerce by subjecting national corporate tender offers to inconsistent
state regulation).
127. See infra notes 176-241 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional analysis of fair
price statutes in light of Supreme Court's decisions in MITE and CTS).
128. See supra notes 28-35, 54-74 and accompanying text (discussing Court's conclusions in
CTS and MITE that, under Williams Act, state regulation of tender offers cannot interfere with
federal regulation of tender offers); supra notes 36-40, 75-90 and accompanying text (discussing
Court's conclusions in CTS and MITE that state takeover legislation cannot subject national tender
offers to inconsistent state regulation).
129. See supra notes 31-34, 55, 56, 59, 69-73 and accompanying text (discussing MITE Court
plurality's view that Williams Act mandates neutrality between shareholders, target corporation
management, and tender offeror while CTS speaks to shareholder protection); supra notes 38-41,
83-90 and accompanying text (discussing MITE Court's balancing of state interest in protecting
state corporations and shareholders with harm to interstate commerce while CTS Court looked to
extraterritorial affect of legislation and determined that state tender offers could not discriminate
between in-state and out-of-state shareholders).
130. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-374a to -374c (West 1987) (regulating business
combinations); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.108, .110 (West Supp. 1988) (same); GA. CODE ANN. §§
14-2-232 to -235 (Supp. 1988) (effective until July 1, 1989) (recodified as amended at GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 14-2-1131 to -1133 (Special Pamphlet 1988) (effective July 1, 1989) (same); Iu. ANN.
STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988) (same); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 271B.12-200
to 271B.12-230 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) (same); LA. R-v. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:132 to
:134 (West Supp. 1988) (same); MD. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603 (1985 & Supp.
1988) (same); MicH. Con. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1775-.1784 (West Supp. 1988) (same); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 79-25-I to -9 (Supp. 1987) (Mississippi Shareholder Protection Act) (regulating business
combinations); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-75 to -80 (Supp. 1987) (North Carolina Shareholder
Protection Act) (regulating business combinations); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Purdon
Supp. 1988) (Pennsylvania Shareholder Protection Act) (regulating business combinations); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to -727.1 (1985 & Supp. 1988) (regulating affiliated transactions); WASH.
Rav. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.425 (West Supp. 1988) (same); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.725 (West
Supp. 1988) (same); supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (describing second generation
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which affect the voting rights of a shareholder that acquires specified
percentages of a corporation's stock, fair price statutes contain provisions
which attempt to ensure that minority shareholders of a target corporation
receive a fair price for the target corporation's shares in a two-tiered
takeover."' A two-tiered takeover consists of two phases, the tender offer
takeover legislation).
Some states have enacted a variation of fair price statutes that, like fair price statutes, require
a tender offeror to pay minority shareholders a fair price for their shares (freezeout statutes). See
ARiz. R v. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1221 to 1223 (Supp. 1987) (requiring tender offeror to pay minority
shareholders a fair price for shares of target corporation under certain conditions); 1988 CONN.
ACTs 88-350 (Reg. Sess.) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 230 (1988) (same); GA. CODE ANN. §§
14-2-236 to -238 (Supp. 1988) (effective until July 1, 1989) (recodified as amended at GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 14-2-1131 to -1133) (Special Pamphlet 1988) (effective July 1, 1989) (same); IND. CODE.
ANN. §§ 23-1-43-1 to -24 (Burns Supp. 1988) (same); Ky. REv. STAT. Am. § 271B.12-210 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) (same); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.673 (West Supp. 1988) (same); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 351.450 to -.459.459 (Vernon 1966 Supp. 1988) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:IOA-
I (West Supp. 1988) (same); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 912 (McKinny 1986 & Supp. 1987) (same);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.716 (West Supp. 1988) (same); also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to 727.1
(1985 & Supp. 1988) (requiring tender offeror to pay minority shareholders a fair price for their
shares and imposing different supermajority voting requirements depending on length of time
interested shareholder has held shares of corporation). Generally, freezeout statutes are substantively
similar to fair price statutes. See infra notes 139-72 and accompanying text (describing mechanics
of various fair price statutes). The freezeout statutes, however, require a shareholder that holds a
certain percentage of the target corporation's stock to wait a specified period of time before
attempting to consummate a business combination. See generally S. P~hmpmco, supra note 7, at
22-24 (describing mechanics of freezeout statutes).
Other states have adopted a variation of both the fair price statutes and control share statutes,
referred to as control share cashout statutes. See ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910 (Supp.
1987) (specifying right of minority shareholders to receive fair price for their shares in target
corporation after consuunation of control transaction); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon
Supp. 1988) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-6-120) (Advance Code Serv. 1988) (same); see also
infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text (describing control share cashout statutes). Unlike fair
price statutes, control share cashout statutes impose no requirements on a tender offeror other
than to pay minority shareholders a fair price for their shares in the target corporation. See ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910 (Supp. 1987) (specifying procedure that controlling person must
follow to ensure minority shareholders receive fair price for shares in target corporation); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1988) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-6-12(1) (Advance
Code Serv. 1988) (same). Further, control share cashout statutes, unlike freezeout statutes, do not
require the tender offeror to wait a specified period of time before attempting to consummate a
business combination. See infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text (discussing mechanics of
control share cashout statutes).
As a result of the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in CTS upholding Indiana's control share
takeover statute, state legislatures have enacted, amended and supplemented various forms of
takeover statutes. Accordingly, the provisions of the takeover statutes reported in this Note may
no longer be applicable in whole or in part.
131. See Scriggins & Clarke, Takeovers and the 1983 Maryland Fair Price Legislation, 43
MD. L. Rev. 266, 266-67 (1984) (discussing mechanics of two-tiered tender offers or frontend
loaded offers). Compare supra notes 47-53, 77-81 and accompanying text (describing mechanics
of control share statutes) with infra notes 139-72 and accompanying text (discussing mechanics of
fair price statutes) and supra note 132-38 and accompanying text (discussing mechanics of two-
tiered tender offer). While no state had adopted a fair price statute before 1983, the idea of
ensuring that minority shareholders receive a fair price for their shares during a merger originated
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phase and the merger phase.' 3 2 During the first phase, the bidder announces
during the 1960's. See Kelly, The Origin and Development of the Fair Price Clause, 15 SEc. REG.
L.J. 267, 268 & n.2 (1987) (discussing origin of fair price clause). Ordinarily, state corporate laws
require a majority of shareholders in a corporation to approve any merger between a corporation
and some other corporation or entity. See MODEL Bus1, rss CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 11.01 (1985 &
Supp. 1986-88); Scriggins & Clarke, supra, at 267-68 (discussing historical background of corporate
law and laws applicable to mergers). Most state corporate laws, however, enable corporations to
include supermajority voting requirements in their corporate charters, which make mergers more
difficult to consummate. See Kelly, supra, at 268 (discussing supermajority voting requirements).
Many corporations have taken advantage of the supermajority voting requirements and included
the requirements in their corporations' charters. Id. at 267-68. 'The supermajority voting require-
ments make a takeover more expensive for a tender offeror because the voting requirements force
the tender offeror to purchase a larger percentage of the corporation's stock. Id. at 269. As a
result, the supermajority voting requirements may force the offeror to pay more for the target
shares than the tender offeror would be willing to pay without the voting requirements. Id. at
267. While supermajority voting requirements attempt to protect shareholders from the possibility
of a freezeout in a corporate takeover, supermajority voting requirements still leave minority
shareholders unprotected from the possibility of a tender offeror freezing them out in a two-tiered
merger. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text (describing freezeout of minority share-
holders).
The supermajority voting requirements, which some corporations' charters contained, became
less effective in deterring takeovers after the 1960's. Kelly, supra, at 269-70. Because of changes
in the financial market and business attitudes, tender offerors have found takeovers of corporations,
including corporations with supermajority voting requirements in their charters, easier to accom-
plish. See id. at 268-70 (describing factors that made corporate charter supermajority requirements
less effective at deterring takeovers). As a result, in 1975, some corporations began to amend their
corporate charters to include fair price clauses. Id. at 280 & n.23. Regardless of the price that a
successful tender offeror offers minority shareholders in the second stage of a two-tiered tender
offer, the tender offeror must comply with any supermajority clause included in a corporate
charter. Id. at 274-76; infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text (describing mechanics of two-
tiered tender offer). The provisions of a fair price clause, however, enable shareholders of the
corporation to waive the supermajority voting requirements if the tender offeror offers a fair price
to the minority shareholders. Kelly, supra, at 274-76.
In addition to provisions in corporate law enabling corporations to include supermajority
voting requirements and fair price clauses in their charters, state legislatures generally include
appraisal procedures in the corporate law to ensure that minority shareholders obtain a fair price
for their shares in the corporation. Id. at 293. Under an appraisal procedure, a minority shareholder
who believes that the amount which the majority shareholders elected to receive in exchange for
their shares in a corporation is unfairly low may dissent. Id. The dissenting shareholder has the
right to have a third party appraise the value of the shares of the target corporation. Id. If the
appraiser finds that the value of the stock is higher than the amount that the majority elected to
receive, the dissenting shareholder can require the corporation to pay the dissenting shareholder
the appraised price. See id. (describing dissenting shareholder's appraisal procedure). By including
dissenting shareholders' appraisal procedures in state corporate laws, state legislatures recognize
that majority shareholders should not determine all corporate matters because the majority
shareholders' decisions may work to the detriment of shareholders. Id.; see infra note 173 and
accompanying text (listing and describing takeover statutes referred to as control share cashout
statutes that include dissenting shareholder's appraisal procedure).
In addition to adopting statutory provisions that specifically protect minority shareholders,
most state corporate laws contain provisions that require interested shareholders to explain to the
other directors the nature of the interested shareholders' interest in a transaction that requires the
directors' approval. See MODEL Bushass CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.31 (1985 & Supp. 1986-88) (requiring
interested shareholder to explain its interest in proposed transaction); infra note 146 and accom-
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the tender offer and the bidder's intention to purchase with cash a
controlling interest of the target corporation's voting shares. 33 The bidder
typically induces shareholders to tender the target corporation's shares by
offering to pay a premium price for the shares. 34 A critical component
of the bidder's strategy is to notify the shareholders that during the second
phase of the takeover, the bidder will exercise the controlling interest
acquired during the tender offer to obtain complete ownership of the
corporation by merging the target corporation into the bidder. 35 Addi-
tionally, during the first phase, the target corporation's shareholders learn
that the bidder, which will survive the merger, will force any remaining
target corporation shareholders to exchange their shares for less consid-
eration than the bidder is willing to pay during the tender offer. 36 Because
panying text (defining interested shareholder). Some states have incorporated similar provisions in
their fair price statutes by authorizing the directors that are not interested shareholders to approve
a proposed business combination. See infra note 166 (listing states that have enacted fair price
statutes that confer greater discretion to disinterested directors); Scriggins & Clarke, supra, at 267
(fair price statutes incorporate traditional notions of conflict of interest and self dealing in new
framework); Romano, supra, 14, at 113 (questioning why states enact takeover statutes when
corporate law provides self-help provisions of which corporations may elect to take advantage).
132. See infra notes 133-38 and accompanying text (describing mechanics of two-tiered tender
offer).
133. See I M. LnIoN & E. STEmERGER, TAKxovmzs & FREnz ouTs § 1.081], at 1-85 (1987)
(describing mechanics of two-tiered takeover); R. Ferrara, T. Carroll & R. Dozier, Tender Offers:
Toughing It Out, in MERGERS AND AcQuisrroNs IN T-HE 1980s: ATTACK AND SURvIVAL. 9, 98
(1987) (Practicing Law Institute Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 558)
(same). While most mergers involve two independent corporations, the tender offeror in a two-
tiered takeover attempt is an interested shareholder that acquired a controlling interest in the target
corporation during the first phase of the takeover. See Note, Second Generation State Takeover
Legislation: Maryland Takes a New Tack, 83 McE. L. REV. 433, 442 n.52 (1984) (unlike tender
offerors in most mergers, successful offerors in merger phase of two-tiered takeovers are interested
shareholders). Because the interested shareholder can insure that the interested shareholder will
receive preferential treatment, the minority shareholders do not receive the favorable treatment
that the interested shareholder does. Id.
134. See 1 M. LIProN & E. STuraEuRo, supra note 133, § 1.08[3][c], at 1-89 (describing
premium price that tender offeror offers target shareholders during tender offer in actual takeover
battle). Critics of two-tiered takeovers find a tender offeror's strategy to obtain control of a
corporation under a two-tiered takeover coercive because the tender offeror typically offers a high
premium price for the shares of the target corporation forcing the shareholders in a target
corporation (target shareholders) to rush to tender their shares and take advantage of the offeror's
pro rata offer. Kelly, supra note 131, at 273. As a result many shareholders rush to tender their
shares in the target corporation to take advantage of the tender offeror's premium price without
considering the independent merits of retaining ownership in the stock. Id.; see Johnson, Corporate
Takeovers and Corporations: Who Are They For?, 43 WAst. & LE L. Ray. 781, 818 & n.159
(1986) (noting that while corporate takeovers may maximize shareholder wealth, corporations and
communities may suffer). Moreover, many shareholders fear that if they do not tender their shares
during the tender offer, the tender offeror later will use the controlling interest that the offeror
acquires during the tender offer to force the remaining shareholders to accept consideration with
a value that is less than the shares' fair market value. Kelly, supra note 131, at 273.
135. Note, supra note 133, at 441 n.48.
136. See id. at 441-42 & n.49 (shareholders that do not tender target corporation's shares
during tender offer must accept consideration for shares that is less than amount that offeror paid
during tender offer).
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the target corporation's shareholders realize that they will receive less for
their shares if they hold the shares until the bidder acquires a controlling
interest in the corporation, and because the shareholders can not assume
that fellow shareholders will refrain from tendering their shares, most of
the target corporation's shareholders feel pressure to tender their shares
immediately after the bidder makes the offer.1 37 A bidder's announcement
of a two-tiered takeover attempt, therefore, creates a stampeding effect
among the shareholders of a target corporation to tender their shares and
take advantage of the tender offer price.
38
In an attempt to ameliorate the coercive effects that two-tiered takeover
attempts have on shareholders, state legislatures have enacted fair price
statutes.3 9 While fair price statutes apply only to situations in which a
bidder has commenced a two-tiered takeover bid, fair price statutes do
not regulate a bidder's tender offer. 40 Rather, fair price statutes impose
certain restrictions during the merger phase of a two-tiered takeover.'
4'
Fair price statutes require an "interested shareholder," a tender offeror
who acquires a specified percentage of a target corporation's shares during
the merger phase, to pay the minority shareholders a price for their shares
that at least equals the amount that the offeror paid for the shares during
the tender offer phase.
142
In 1983 Maryland enacted the first fair price statute. 43 The provisions
of the Maryland Act apply to Maryland corporations, other than invest-
137. Id. at 442 n.49; see R. Ferrara, T. Carroll & R. Dozier, supra note 133, at 98-99
(shareholders tender target corporations' shares during first phase of tender offer because most
shareholders are certain that offeror will consummate tender offer). At least one commentator has
noted that, because most of the shareholders generally rush to take advantage of a high tender
offer price, a bidder actually may be able to offer a lower price for the target corporation's shares
in a two-tiered tender offer than the shares' fair market value. See Scriggins & Clarke, supra 133,
at 273.
138. See Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 131, at 270 (two-tiered tender offers create stampeding
effect among shareholders). At least one commentator has referred to the shareholders' stampede
to take advantage of a tender offer in a two-tiered takeover as "prisoner's dilemma." See Brudney
& Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. REa. 297, 337 (1974)
(discussing prisoner's dilemma in takeover attempt).
139. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text (describing mechanics of two-tiered
takeovers and coercive effect that two-tiered takeovers have on minority shareholders).
140. See supra notes 5-6, 28-35, 54-74 and accompanying text (stating that Williams Act
regulates tender offers and explaining purpose of Williams Act).
141. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp, of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1636, 1650 (1987) (stating that
state corporate laws legitimately may regulate mergers). But see Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624, 645 (1982) (Illinois statute regulating tender offer was invalid because tender offer does not
constitute internal affair of target corporation).
142. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text (describing merger phase of two-tiered
takeovers); infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text (describing how fair price statutes ensure
minority shareholder fair price for shares of target corporations).
143. MD. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603 (1985 & Supp. 1988); see Scriggins
& Clarke, supra note 131, at 272 (noting that primary purpose of Maryland Act is to correct
inequities that result from two-tiered takeovers). Before the Maryland General Assembly enacted
its fair price statute, Maryland had adopted a form of first generation takeover legislation that
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ment companies and corporations having less than one hundred share-
holders with voting rights, involved in a two-tiered takeover attempt.
144
Specifically, the Maryland Act defines certain transactions between an
interested shareholder and a Maryland corporation, including a merger,
as a "business combination.' 45 An interested shareholder under the Mary-
required a tender offeror to notify the secretary of state twenty days before the date that the
offeror intended to make a tender offer. 1976 Md. Laws 1712 (codified at MD. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns
CoDE ANN. §§ 11-901 to -908 (Supp. 1984)). After the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland determined in 1982 that Maryland's first generation takeover statute was unconsti-
tutional, the Maryland Bar Association, not wanting to leave Maryland corporations unprotected
from hostile takeovers, drafted a form of second generation takeover legislation. S. Pmasr'imo,
supra note 7, at 6; see Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522, 532 (D. Md.
1982) (Maryland's first generation takeover statute was unconstitutional under Williams Act and
commerce clause). After Maryland's General Assembly passed the proposed takeover legislation,
some of Maryland's corporations began to express their opposition to the bill to Governor Hughes
of Maryland. See Note, supra 133, at 441 n.47. Governor Hughes vetoed the bill because Maryland
wanted to build a pro-business image and because some Maryland corporations feared that tender
offerors might acquire corporations through hostile takeovers. S. PAMmPnro, supra note 7, at 16.
The Maryland Act, which the legislature passed after vetoing the original bill, is a concession by
Governor Hughes to critics of the earlier bill who were concerned about the future of their
corporations. See id. (arguing that original form of Maryland's takeover bill would interfere with
corporations' normal business affairs). Id. Other critics, however, condemned the Maryland Act
for entrenching corporations' existing managements at the expense of shareholders. Id. at 16-17.
The professed intent of the legislature in enacting the Maryland Act, however, was to protect
minority shareholders against hostile tender offerors in the merger phase of a two-tiered takeover.
See Letter from Stephen H. Sachs, Att'y Gen. to Harry Hughes, Governor of Maryland (June
13, 1983) (indicating that purpose of Maryland Act is to protect minority shareholders in two-
tiered takeover attempt). See generally Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 131, at 266-279 (detailing
legislative history and mechanics of Maryland Act).
144. See MD. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 3-601(e), -601(h), -603(e) (1985 & Supp. 1988)
(describing entities that are subject to provisions of Maryland Act and describing corporations
that are exempt from Maryland Act); also infra notes 161-62 (describing opt out provision of
Maryland Act).
145. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 3-601(e) (1985 & Supp. 1988). The Maryland Act
describes a business combination as including one of five transactions between a target corporation
and an interested shareholder. Id.; see infra note 146 and accompanying text (defining interested
shareholder). First, a business combination under the Maryland Act includes any merger of,
consolidation of, or share exchange between the target corporation and the interested shareholder.
MD. CoRPs. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 3-601(e)(1) (1985 & Supp. 1988). Second, a business
combination may include any extraordinary sale, lease, or other disposition of at least ten percent
of the corporation's stock to any interested stockholder. Id. § 3-601(e)(2). If the Maryland Act
did not include this definition, the interested shareholder could avoid the requirements of the Act
by exercising its controlling interest in the target corporation and forcing the target corporation
to give up the corporation's assets. Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 131, at 275. By forcing the
target corporation to sell the target corporation's assets, the interested shareholder effectively could
squeeze out the minority shareholders. Id. Third, a business combination under the Maryland Act
includes the target corporation's issuance or transfer to any interested shareholder of equity
securities having an aggregate market value of five percent of the total market value of the
corporation's outstanding stock. MD. CORPs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 3-601(e)(3) (1985 & Supp.
1988). By including the third definition of a business combination in. the Maryland Act, the
legislature intended to prevent a tender offeror from purchasing enough of a target corporation's
authorized but unissued stock, or treasury stock, to enable the acquiring corporation to satisfy
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land Act includes any person, o' her than the Maryland corporation that
is the tender offeror's target, that owns a minimum of ten percent of the
outstanding voting shares of the corporation. ,46 The Maryland Act requires
the board of directors of a Maryland corporation to recommend to the
shareholders that the shareholders approve a transaction satisfying the
Maryland Act's definition of a business combination.' 47 Moreover, the
Maryland Act requires that, before effectuating a business combination,
eighty percent of all shareholders holding outstanding voting shares and
two-thirds of the disinterested shareholders must approve the proposed
business combination (supermajority voting requirements).' 4 If the inter-
ested shareholder satisfies the fairness requirements that the Maryland Act
sets forth, however, the Maryland Act exempts the business combination
from the supermajority voting requirements.
49
To satisfy the Maryland Act's fairness requirements and thus, to
exempt the business combination from the Maryland Act's supermajority
voting requirements, the interested shareholder must satisfy a two-prong
fairness test.' 50 The fairness requirements include stock price conditions
and nonprice conditions. '1 The Maryland legislature designed the stock
price conditions to ensure that minority shareholders receive at least the
same cash value for their stock during the second stage of a two-tiered
the Maryland Act's supermajority requirement. Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 131, at 275-76;
supra note 148 (discussing supermajority voting requirements). Fourth, a business combination
includes any liquidation or dissolution of a Maryland corporation in which the interested shareholder
will receive any consideration other than cash. MD. CoaRs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 3-601(e)(4)
(1985 & Supp. 1988). Last, the Maryland Act defines a business combination as any reclassification,
recapitalization, or other transaction or series of transactions that has or have the effect of
increasing by at least five percent the interested shareholder's total number of shares of the
corporation. Id. § 3-601(e)(5).
146. MD. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns CoDE ANN. § 3-6010) (1985 & Supp. 1988). In addition to
defining an interested shareholder as including any person owning a minimum of ten percent of
the voting stock of a corporation, the Maryland Act defines certain affiliates of a corporation as
interested shareholders. Id. The Maryland Act defines an affiliate of a corporation as a person
that at least one intermediary controls. Id. § 3-601(b). Accordingly, an affiliate of a corporation
satisfies the Maryland Act's definition of an interested shareholder if the affiliate beneficially owns
at least ten percent of the corporation's voting stock during all or any part of the two year period
before the affiliate announces the proposed business combination. Id. § 3-601(j)(1)(ii). Generally,
the Maryland Act defines a beneficial owner as a person that has the right, by agreement or other
arrangement, to acquire voting shares of a corporation or that directly or indirectly owns voting
stock. Id. § 3-601(d).
147. Id. § 3-602; see supra note 145 and accompanying text (describing definition of business
combination under Maryland Act). In addition to requiring the board of directors to recommend
that the shareholders approve a business combination, the Maryland Act requires eighty percent
of the shareholders holding outstanding voting shares and two-thirds of the disinterested directors
to approve the consummation of a business combination (supermajority voting requirements). Id.
148. MD. Cons's & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 3-602 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
149. Id. § 3-603; see infra notes 150-57 and accompanying text (discussing Maryland Act's
fairness requirements as alternative to satisfying supermajority voting requirements).
150. MD. CoRps. & Ass'Ns CoDE ANN. § 3-603 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
151. See Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 131, at 276-77 (referring to two prongs of Maryland
Act's fairness test as stock price and nonprice conditions).
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takeover as the offeror paid the tendering shareholders during the first
phase of the takeover attempt. 5 2 To obtain an exemption from the
supermajority voting requirements under the stock price conditions, the
*interested shareholder must offer the minority target shareholders the
highest of three possible prices for the target shares, determined by a
specific price formula that the Maryland Act sets forth.153 The pricing
formula essentially requires the interested shareholder to pay the minority
shareholders an amount that is equal to the highest price that the interested
shareholder paid for the target corporation's shares before the announce-
ment of the proposed merger.
5 4
In addition to complying with the pricing provisions of the Maryland
Act, the interested shareholder must comply with certain nonprice condi-
tions. 155 The Maryland legislature included the nonprice conditions in the
Maryland Act to avoid any self-dealing between the corporation and the
interested shareholder that would harm minority shareholders. 5 6 One of
the nonprice conditions requires the target corporation to pay in full all
152. See id. at 277-78 (describing stock price conditions in Maryland Act and discussing
legislative purpose of including stock price conditions in Maryland Act). In addition to requiring
the interested shareholder to pay the holders of common shares of stock an amount that at least
equals the amount that the tender offeror paid for the corporation's stock during the tender offer,
the pricing formula in the Maryland Act requires that minority shareholders receive cash in
exchange for their shares in the target corporation. MND. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns CODE Am. §§ 3-
603(b)(3) (1985 & Supp. 1988). The interested shareholder, however, may choose to pay minority
shareholders the same form of consideration that the interested shareholder paid for the largest
block of the target corporation's stock. Id.
153. MD. CoRms. & Ass'Ns. CODE ANN. §§ 3-603(b)(1)-(3) (1985 & Supp. 1988). To ensure
that the interested shareholder will pay minority shareholders a fair price for their shares in the
target corporation, the Maryland Act requires the interested shareholder to pay the minority
shareholders the highest price for the target corporation's common shares of stock determined as
follows: (1) the highest price that the interested shareholder paid for the target corporation's stock
during the tender offer or during the two year period before the interested shareholder announced
the proposed business combination, (2) the higher of the stock's value on the date the interested
shareholder announced the proposed business combination, or the date on which the tender offeror
became an interested shareholder, or (3) the product of the stock's price as determined in number
two above, multiplied by the highest price that any interested shareholder paid for the target
shares during the two year period before the interested shareholder announced the proposed
business combination divided by the market value of the common stock on the first day that the
interested shareholder acquired the stock during the same two year period. Id.
While the Maryland Act requires that an interested shareholder comply with the Act's formula
in purchasing common shares of the target corporation's stock, the Act contains a separate formula
for valuing shares other than common stock. Id. § 3-603(b)(2). The pricing formulas, however,
contain nearly the same calculations and require the interested shareholder to pay minority
shareholders the highest of three possible prices. See Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 131, at 277-
78 (describing mechanics of price formula for both common stock and shares other than common
stock).
154. MD. ComS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-603(b)(1) (1985 & Supp. 1988).
155. Id. § 3-603(b)(4); see infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text (describing nonprice
conditions of Maryland Act).
156. See S. P~imjN4To, supra note 7, at 17 (stating that Maryland Act contains nonprice
conditions to prevent self-dealing).
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dividends on the corporation's I referred shares from the time that the
tender offeror becomes an interes.ed shareholder until the interested share-
holder consummates the business combination.
157
While an interested shareholder, to consummate a business combina-
tion, must comply with the supermajority voting requirements or, alter-
natively, the fairness provisions of the Maryland Act, the Maryland Act
exempts certain business combinations from the Act's requirements.' 58 The
Maryland Act allows a board of directors to exempt a business combination
from the Maryland Act's requirements so long as the board of directors
approves of the business combination before the date that the tender
offeror becomes an interested shareholder. 5 9 In allowing the board of
directors to exempt certain business combinations from the Maryland Act's
requirements, the legislature intended to prevent the Act from deterring
friendly mergers. 60 Moreover, the Maryland Act provides that the share-
holders may adopt a charter amendment that completely exempts the
corporation from. the provisions of the Maryland Act. 61 A Maryland
corporation may "opt out" of the Act's coverage by amending its charter
so long as the shareholders voting to approve the amendment satisfy the
same supermajority voting requirements necessary to effectuate a business
combination. 1
62
In addition to Maryland, other states have enacted fair price statutes
that contain provisions comparable to the Maryland Act's provisions.'
63
While states like Connecticut, Louisiana, and Michigan have adopted fair
price statutes that are nearly identical to the Maryland Act, other states
157. MD. CoRps. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 3-603(b)(4)(i)(1) (1985 & Supp. 1988). In addition
to requiring the target corporation fully to pay all dividends on preferred shares of stock, the
nonprice conditions prevent the target corporation from reducing the annual rate of dividends
payable on any class of the corporation's stock other than preferred stock. Id. § 3-603(b)(4)(i)(2)(A).
In addition the Maryland Act requires that the target corporation increase the annual rate of
dividends as necessary to reflect any recapitalization or similar transaction that would reduce the
number of outstanding shares of stock. Id. § 3-603(b)(4Xi)(2)(B). Moreover, the Maryland Act
prevents any interested shareholder from acquiring additional shares of stock unless the interested
shareholder obtains the stock from a stock split or dividend payment. Id. § 3-603(b)(4)(i)(3).
Finally, the Maryland Act prevents the corporation from making any loans, guarantees, or other
financial assistance that would benefit the interested shareholder. Id. § 3-601(5).
158. See id. § 3-603(c)-(e) (exempting, under specified conditions, certain corporations and
companies from provisions of Maryland Act); infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text (describing
corporations and companies that are exempt from Maryland Act's requirements).
159. MD. Cosus. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 3-603(c)(1)(ii) (1985 & Supp. 1988); see Scriggins
& Clarke, supra note 131, at 273 (discussing purpose of allowing board of directors to approve
exempting certain business combinations from Maryland Act's requirements).
160. See Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 131, at 274-75 (stating that Maryland Act does not
affect friendiy takeovers so long as parties negotiate terms before tender offeror becomes interested
shareholder).
161. MD. Coaps. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 3-603(e)(iii) (1985 & Supp. 1988).
162. Id.
163. See supra note 130 (listing states, including Maryland, that have adopted fair price
statutes).
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have enacted fair price statutes that contain some material differences.'6
164. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-374a to -374c (West 1987) (fair price statute
containing provisions substantively similar to Maryland Act); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:132-:134
(West Supp. 1988) (same); MICr. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 450.1775-.1784 (West Supp. 1988); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 180.725 (West Supp. 1988) (same). Throughout this footnote, which describes fair
price satutes that contain nearly identical provisions as the Maryland Act, certain defined terms
are used. Unless otherwise indicated, the reader may assume that the statutes described below
contain the same supermajority voting requirements that an interested shareholder must satisfy to
consummate a business combination under the Maryland Act. See supra notes 148-57 and
accompanying text (describing mechanics of supermajority voting requirements and fairness re-
quirements under Maryland Act). In addition the reader may assume, unless otherwise indicated,
that the provisions of the statutes only apply to the state's domestic corporations, which corpo-
rations may opt out of the states' fair price statutes in the manner described in the Maryland
Act. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text (describing opt out provisions under Maryland
Act). Unless otherwise indicated, the reader may assume that the following terms have the same
meaning as the meaning ascribed to the term in the discussion of the Maryland Act: business
combination, interested shareholder, nonprice conditions, price conditions and supermajority voting
requirements.
CoNNcncuT
In 1984 Connecticut enacted a fair price statute (Connecticut Act) that is substantively similar
to the Maryland Act. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-374a to -374c (West 1987); see supra notes
144-162 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Maryland Act). In addition Connecticut
enacted a freezeout statute. 1988 Conn. Acts 88-350 (Reg. Sess.); see supra note 130 and
accompanying text (describing freezeout statutes). Like the Maryland Act, the Connecticut Act
authorizes a corporation to opt out of the Act's provisions by amending the corporate charter so
long as the shareholders satisfy the same supermajority voting requirements that are necessary to
approve a proposed business combination. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 33-374(d) (West 1987); supra
note 148 and accompanying text (describing supermajority voting requirements); infra note 169-70
and accompanying text (discussing opt out provisions in certain fair price statutes).
In enacting the Connecticut Act, the Connecticut legislature was influenced greatly by Aetna
Life and Casualty Insurance (Aetna), a Connecticut corporation. Romano, supra note 14, at 122-
23 & n.33. Highly ranked among publicly traded corporate stocks, Aetna represented a considerable
influence in Connecticut's economy. Id. at 123 & n.34. Aetna and other proponents of the bill,
which became the Connecticut Act, avoided adverse publicity for the bill by introducing the bill
as an amendment to a minor bill. Id. The Connecticut legislature, therefore, enacted the fair price
statute with little opposition. See id. at 125-26 (stating that even if bill's proponents had opened
bill to public discussion, fair price bill would have faced little opposition). Professor Romano,
who is a professor of law at Yale University, infers from the bill's lack of publicity that Aetna
had a reason for insuring that the public remain uninformed of the bill's contents. See id. at 128-
131 (discussing possible reasons for Aetna's motivation in avoiding publicity for bill). Professor
Romano suggests that Aetna was concerned that Aetna might be a likely target for a takeover.
See id. at 129 (reasoning that because insurance industry was suffering, financial reports advised
investors not to purchase Aetna's stock). Moreover, Professor Romano reasons that Aetna chose
not to recommend an amendment to Aetna's charter to add a fair price clause because institutional
investors, which tend to disapprove of any charter provisions that deter possible takeovers, held
a majority of Aetna's stock. Id. at 129-30; see supra note 131 (describing fair price clauses in
corporate charters). Moreover, Aetna did not want to amend its charter to include a fair price
clause because such charter provisions tend to signal to corporate tender offerors that a company
perceives itself as a candidate for a takeover. Id.
LOUISIANA
In 1984 the Louisiana legislature enacted a fair price statute (Louisiana Act) that is substantively
similar to the Maryland Act. LA. Ray. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:132-:134 (West Supp. 1988); see supra
notes 144-62 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Maryland Act). In addition to
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The differences that exist between the Maryland Act and other fair price
statutes fall into three general categories.' 65 First, a number of states have
enacted fair price statutes that confer upon incumbent boards of directors
adopting a fair price statute, the Louisiana legislature adopted a control share statute. Id. §§
12:135-:140.2 (West Supp. 1988); see supra note 99 and accompanying text (describing mechanics
of Louisiana's control share statute). Like the Maryland Act, the Louisiana Act allows a corporation
to opt out of the Act's provisions by amending the corporation's charter if the shareholders satisfy
the supermajority voting requirements necessary to approve a proposed business combination. LA.
REV. STAT. ANm. § 12.134E(1)(b) (West Supp. 1988); see supra note 148 and accompanying text
(describing supermajority voting requirements); see infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text
(discussing opt out provisions in certain fair price statutes).
MICIGAN
In 1984 Michigan enacted a fair price statute (Michigan Act) that is substantively similar to
the Maryland Act. MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 450.1775-.1784 (West Supp. 1988). The pricing
formula in the Michigan Act, however, is slightly less complex than the Maryland Act's formula.
Compare MIcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1781(l)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1988) (describing pricing
formula in Michigan Act) with MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-603(b)(3) (1985 & Supp.
1987) (describing pricing formula in Maryland Act) and supra note 153 and accompanying text
(describing pricing formula in Maryland Act). Like the Maryland Act, the Michigan Act allows a
corporation to opt out of the Act's provisions by amending the corporate charter if the shareholders
satisfy the same supermajority voting requirements necessary to approve a proposed business
combination. MICH. Comp. LAWS Am. § 450.17840)(b) (West Supp. 1988); see infra notes 169-
70 and accompanying text (discussing opt out provisions in certain fair pricd statutes).
WISCONSIN
In 1984 Wisconsin adopted a fair price statute (Wisconsin Act) that is substantially similar to
the Maryland Act. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.725 (West Supp. 1988). Wisconsin also adopted a
control share statute and a three year freezeout statute. See id. § 180.25(9) (control share statutes);
id. § 180.726 (West Supp. 1988) (three year freezeout statute); supra notes 47-53, 77-81 and
accompanying text (describing mechanics of control share statutes); supra note 131 (describing
mechanics of freezeout statute). The Wisconsin Act, however, applies not only to issuing public
corporations, but to corporations that elect to have the provisions of the Wisconsin Act apply to
it. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.725(l)(d), (3)(c) (West Supp. 1988). The Wisconsin Act applies to any
business combination between an issuing public corporation and a significant shareholder. Id. §
180.725(1)(d). The Wisconsin Act defines a significant shareholder as two or more individuals
owning ten percent or more of the voting shares of an issuing public corporation. Id. §
180.725(l)(lm).
The Wisconsin Act imposes the same supermajority voting requirements on a corporation
before consummating certain business combinations as the Maryland Act does. Id. § 180.725(3a);
supra note 148 and accompanying text (describing supermajority voting requirements). Similarly,
the Wisconsin Act waives the supermajority voting requirements, if the significant shareholder
agrees to pay a certain price for the issuing public corporation's stock. Wis. STAT. ANN. §
180.725(3a). If the significant shareholder waives the supermajority voting requirements by agreeing
to pay a certain price for the shares, the Wisconsin Act does not impose nonprice conditions on
the significant shareholder as a prerequisite to consummating the business combination. Compare
id. (Wisconsin Act imposes no nonprice requirements on significant shareholder before consum-
mating business combination) with supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text (describing Maryland
Act's nonprice fairness requirements). Like the Maryland Act, the Wisconsin Act allows a
corporation to opt out of the Wisconsin Act's provisions by amending the corporate charter if
the shareholders satisfy the same supermajority voting requirements necessary to approve a proposed
business combination. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.725(3)(b)3; see infra notes 169-70 and accompanying
text (discussing opt out provisions in certain fair price statutes).
165. See infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text (discussing material differences between
Maryland Act and fair price states in other states).
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considerably more discretion than the Maryland Act.1 66 For example, under
166. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.108, .110 (West Supp. 1988) (fair price statute conferring
more discretion to disinterested board of directors than interested directors); GA. CODE ANN. §§
14-2-232 to -235 (Supp. 1988) (effective until July 1, 1989) (same) (recodified as amended at GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-1131 to -1133 (Special Pamphlet 1988) (effective July 1, 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 32, para. 7.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988) (same); KY. Rsv. STAT. ANN. §§ 271B.12-200 to
271B.12-230 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) (same); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-25-1 to -9 (Supp.
1987) (Mississippi Shareholder Protection Act) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-75 to -80 (Supp.
1987) (North Carolina Shareholder Protection Act) (same); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1
(Purdon Supp. 1988) (Pennsylvania Shareholder Protection Act) (same); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-
725 to -727 (1985 & Supp. 1988) (same). Throughout this footnote, which describes certain fair
price statutes that confer upon certain members of the board of directors considerably more
discretion than the Maryland Act does, certain defined terms are used. Unless otherwise indicated,
the reader may assume that the statutes described below contain the same supermajority voting
requirements that an interested shareholder must satisfy to consummate a business combination.
See supra notes 148-57 and accompanying text (describing mechanics of supermajority voting
requirements and fairness requirements under Maryland Act). In addition, the reader may assume,
unless otherwise indicated, that the provisions of the statutes only apply to the domestic corpo-
rations, which corporations may opt out of the states' fair price statutes in the manner described
in the Maryland Act. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text (describing opt out provisions
under Maryland Act). Unless otherwise indicated, the reader may assume the following terms have
substantially the same meaning as the meaning ascribed the term in the description above of the
Maryland Act: business combination, interested shareholder, nonprice conditions, price conditions
and supermajority voting requirements.
FLORIDA
In 1987 Florida adopted a fair price statute (Florida Act). FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.108, .110
(West Supp. 1988). In addition, Florida enacted a control share statute. Id. § 607.109 (Florida
Control Share Acquisition Statute); see supra note 115 (describing mechanics of Florida control
share statute).
Unlike the provisions of most fair price statutes, which apply only to domestic corporations,
the Florida Act applies to domestic corporations and certain foreign corporations. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 607.110 (West Supp. 1988); see infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text (discussing fair
price statutes that apply to foreign corporations). The Act's requirements essentially apply to
foreign corporations that have authority to do business in Florida, that have a minimum of one
hundred shareholders that maintain a principal place of business or substantial assets in Florida,
that employ over five hundred residents, that pay over $5,000,000 in payroll to Florida employees
and that have a certain number of Florida residents that hold shares of stock in the foreign
corporation. FLA. STAT. ANNi. § 607.110 (West Supp. 1988).
While the Florida Act generally contains provisions that are similar to the Maryland Act, the
Florida Act, unlike the Maryland Act, confers to the disinterested directors the power to exercise
greater discretion in certain matters than the Florida Act grants other directors on the board. Id.
§ 607.108(3)-(4)(a). Specifically, the Florida Act enables an interested shareholder to avoid satisfying
the Act's supermajority voting requirements or fairness requirements if a majority of the disinter-
ested directors vote to exempt the proposed "affiliated transaction" from the Act. Id. § 607.108(4)(a).
The Florida Act uses the term "affiliated transactions" rather than "business combinations" to
define certain transactions that are subject to supermajority voting or fair price requirements. See
id. § 607.108(l)(b) (Florida Act's definition of affiliated transactions is substantively similar to
definition of business combination under Maryland Act); supra note 145 and accompanying text
(describing Maryland Act's definition of business combination). The Florida Act also gives the
disinterested directors, upon majority approval, the authority to determine whether aperson satisfies
the Florida Act's definition of an interested shareholder, and whether other provisions under the
Act are satisfied. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.108(1)0), (3) (West Supp. 1988). The Florida Act defines
a disinterested director as any member of the board of directors who served on the board of
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the Mississippi and Virginia fair price statutes, a board of directors may
directors before the tender offeror became an interested director. Id. § 607.108(1)(h). Moreover,
the definition of a disinterested director includes any director that a majority of the disinterested
directors elected to be a director of the board. Id. While the Florida Act's definition of an
interested shareholder is substantively similar to the Maryland Act's definition, the Florida Act
specifically excludes from the definition of an interested shareholder any of the corporation's
savings, employee stock ownership, or other employee benefit plans. Id. § 607.108(k).
In addition to conferring greater discretion to the disinterested directors, the Florida Act
requires an affirmative supermajority vote of two-thirds of the disinterested shareholders to approve
an affiliated transaction. Id. § 607.108(2). The Florida Act allows an interested shareholder to
avoid the supermajority voting requirements under the Act as long as the interested shareholder
satisfies certain price and nonprice fairness provisions. Id. § 607.108(4)(f)1-4; supra notes 151-57
and accompanying text (defining nonprice conditions and price conditions). The Florida Act
specifies that the corporation must satisfy the nonprice conditions during the three year period
ending on the date that the interested shareholder announces the proposed transaction. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 607.108(4)(d)3 (West Supp. 1988). The Florida Act requires the board of directors to mail
proxies to the shareholders prior to the consummation of the affiliated transaction, notifying the
shareholders of the affiliated transaction. Id. § 607.108(4)(f)5. The Florida Act's requirements,
however, do not apply to a corporation with less than three hundred shareholders, to an interested
shareholder that owns at least eighty percent of the corporation's outstanding voting shares for a
minimum of five years preceding the announcement date, to an investment company, or to certain
interested shareholders described under the Act. Id. § 607.108(4)(b)-(e). Further, the provisions of
the Florida Act do not apply if a majority of the disinterested directors approve the interested
shareholder's acquisition of the shares, or if an interested shareholder owns a minimum of ninety
percent of the outstanding voting shares of the corporation. Id. § 607.108(4)(d). Moreover, the
corporation may elect to opt out of the Florida Act's requirements if a majority of the disinterested
directors vote to approve the affiliated transaction. Id. § 607.108(4)(a). In addition the Florida
Act allows a corporation to opt out of the Act's provisions by amending the corporate charter if
a majority of the shareholders approve the amendment. Id. § 607.108(6). The Florida Act, however,
provides that the opt out amendment shall not apply to any interested shareholder's affiliated
transaction until eighteen months after the shareholders approve the amendment. Id.; see infra
notes 169-70 and accompanying text (discussing opt out provision in fair price statutes).
GEORGIA
In 1985 Georgia adopted a fair price statute (Georgia Act). GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-232 to
-235 (Supp. 1988) (effective until July 1, 1989) (recodified as amended at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-
2-1131 to -1133 (Special Pamphlet 1988) (effective July 1, 1989). While the Georgia Act substantively
is quite similar to the Maryland Act, the Georgia Act significantly differs from the Maryland Act
by conferring to the disinterested directors, which the Georgia Act defines as continuing directors,
greater discretion in certain matters. Id. § 14-2-232(6). Under the Georgia Act, a continuing
director may be a member of the board of directors that served on the board before the tender
offeror became an interested shareholder. Id. § 14-2-233(1). Moreover, a continuing director also
may be any director of the board that a majority of the continuing directors elected to serve on
the board. Id. The Georgia Act has two alternative requirements for approving business combi-
nations. Id. § 14-2-233(1). First, the Georgia Act requires that at least three continuing directors
remain on the board of directors of a Georgia corporation at the time of the approval and that
the continuing directors unanimously approve any proposed business combination. Id. Alternatively,
the Georgia Act requires that two-thirds of the continuing directors and a majority of the
disinterested shareholders affirmatively vote to approve the business combination. Id. § 14-2-233(2).
In addition to conferring greater discretion on the continuing directors, the Georgia Act allows
the interested shareholder to avoid the supermajority voting requirements so long as the interested
shareholder complies with certain stock price and nonprice conditions. Id. § 14-2-234(b); supra
notes 151-57 and accompanying text (describing price and nonprice conditions). The interested
shareholder can avoid satisfying certain nonprice conditions so long as a majority of the continuing
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approve a business combination after a tender offeror becomes an inter-
directors approve the interested shareholder's proposed business combination. GA. CODE ANN. §
14-2-234(b)(3)(A) (Supp. 1988). Moreover, once a shareholder assumes the status of an interested
shareholder, the Georgia Act prohibits any interested shareholder from acquiring more than one
percent of the stock in the target corporation in any year unless a majority of the continuing
directors approve of the acquisition. Id.
The provisions of the Georgia Act apply only to corporations that amend their bylaws
specifically to include the fair price provisions. Id. § 14-2-235(a). If a corporation desires to opt
out of the Georgia statute after amending its bylaws, the corporation may repeal the bylaw
provisions so long as two-thirds of the continuing directors and a majority of the disinterested
shareholders approve. Id. § 14-2-235(b). Moreover, the Georgia Act does not apply to interested
shareholders that continuously have retained the status of interested shareholders for the three-
year period prior to the proposed business combination and that have not increased their holdings
in any single class of stock by greater than one percent. Id. § 14-2-235(c).
ILUNoIs
In 1985 Illinois adopted a fair price statute (Illinois Act) that contains a number of variations
from the Maryland Act. ILu. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988). The Illinois
Act confers upon the disinterested directors the power to exercise greater discretion than the other
directors of the board may exercise. Id. ch. 32, para. 7.85B(1), B(2)(d), C(H). Specifically, the
Illinois Act enables an interested shareholder to avoid satisfying the supermajority voting require-
ments or fairness provisions if two-thirds of the disinterested directors approve of the proposed
business combination. Id. ch. 32, para. 7.85B(l). Moreover, the Illinois Act authorizes the
disinterested directors, upon majority approval, to determine whether a person satisfies the Act's
definition of an interested shareholder and whether certain other provisions under the Act are
satisfied. Id. ch. 32, para. 7.85C(U). The Illinois Act essentially defines a disinterested director as
either a member of the board of directors who served on the board before the tender offeror
became an interested shareholder or any director that a majority of the disinterested directors
elects to serve as a director on the corporation's board. Id. ch. 32, para. 7.85C(7)(b). The Illinois
Act specifically excludes any directors that an interested shareholder nominates to run in an Illinois
corporation's election of directors. Id. ch. 32, para. 7.85C(7)(c).
In addition to conferring greater discretion to the disinterested directors than to the interested
directors of the board, the Illinois Act requires a majority of the disinterested shareholders with
voting rights to approve any business combination. Id. ch. 32, para. 7.85A(e)(ii). Moreover, the
Illinois Act requires that eighty percent of the holders of outstanding voting stock approve a
business combination. Id. ch. 32, para. 7.85A()(e)(i). The Illinois Act, however, allows an interested
shareholder to avoid the supermajority voting requirements so long as the interested shareholder
satisfies certain stock price and nonprice conditions. Id. ch. 32, para. 7.85B; supra notes 151-57
and accompanying text (describing price conditions and nonprice conditions); supra note 148 and
accompanying text (describing supermajority voting requirements). Unlike the nonprice conditions
that most fair price statutes contain, the Illinois Act requires the target corporation to mail a
proxy statement to the shareholders describing the proposed business combination at least thirty
days before the business combination becomes effective. In. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85B(2)(f)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
The Illinois Act applies to all Illinois corporations that must register with the SEC pursuant
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. ch. 32, para. 7.85A. The Illinois Act allows a
corporation to opt out of the Act's coverage by amending its corporate charter if the shareholders
satisfy the same supermajority voting requirements necessary to consummate a business combi-
nation. Id.
KENmcucKY
In 1984 Kentucky enacted a fair price statute (Kentucky Act). KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
271B.12-200 to 271B.12-230 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988). Ashland Oil, Inc. (Ashland Oil),
which was Kentucky's largest corporation when the legislature enacted the Act, was primarily
responsible for the passage of the Kentucky Act. S. PAmlpINTo, supra note 7, at 22. Before the
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ested shareholder. 67 Under the Maryland Act, however, a board of direc-
Kentucky Act's passage, Canadian investors threatened to takeover Ashland Oil. Id. Ashland Oil
and other proponents of the bill that became the Kentucky Act urged the legislature to pass the
bill, arguing that a successful takeover of Ashland Oil would destroy the state's economy and
would result in possible employee layoffs and plant closings. Id. The proponents of the bill
contended that, if the bill did not pass, the Canadians would profit at the expense of employees'
wages. Id. Accordingly, the proponents of the bill urged Kentucky's legislature to pass the bill
and argued that passage would protect other Kentucky corporations and their employees from the
threat of future hostile takeovers. Id.
While the Kentucky Act substantively is similar in .most aspects to the Maryland Act, the
Kentucky Act significantly differs from the Maryland Act by conferring to the disinterested
directors, which the Kentucky Act defines as continuing directors, considerably more discretion in
certain matters. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 271B.12-200(il), -210(3),(4), -220(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1988). The Kentucky Act defines a continuing director as a member of the board of
directors who served on the board before the tender offeror became an interested shareholder. Id.
§ 271B.12-200(6). Moreover, the definition of a continuing director includes any director that a
majority of the continuing board of directors affirmatively approved at a meeting in which a
quorum of the disinterested directors was present. Id. Specifically, the Kentucky Act enables an
interested shareholder to avoid the supermajority voting requirements or fairness conditions if a
majority of the continuing directors approve of the proposed business combination at a meeting
in which a majority of the continuing directors are present. Id. § 271B.12-220(4)(a).
In addition to conferring greater discretion to the continuing directors, the Kentucky Act,
like the Maryland Act, imposes supermajority voting requirements to approve a business combi-
nation. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-2101)(a)-(b), (Michie Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); see supra
note 148 and accompanying text (describing supermajority voting requirements). The Kentucky
Act, however, disallows an interested shareholder from completing any business combination unless
the interested shareholder has held its stock in the corporation for a five-year period that commences
on the day that the tender offeror became an interested shareholder. KY. Rav. STAT. ANN. §
271B.12-210(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988). The Kentucky Act provides an exception to
the five year requirement if the board of directors approves the business combination before the
tender offeror becomes an interested shareholder. Id. Moreover, the Kentucky Act enables the
shareholders of a corporation to avoid the supermajority voting requirements under the Kentucky
Act if the interested shareholder satisfies certain stock price and nonprice conditions. Id. § 271B. 12-
220(2); supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text (describing price conditions and nonprice
conditions). In addition, the Kentucky Act allows a corporation to opt out of the Act's requirements
if the shareholders satisfy the same supermajority voting requirements necessary to consummate a
business combination. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-220(5)(a)(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1988).
Mississust
In 1985 Mississippi adopted a fair price statute that the legislature named the Mississippi
Shareholder Protection Act (Mississippi Act). Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-25-1 to -9 (Supp. 1987).
While the Mississippi Act generally contains provisions that substantively are similar to the Maryland
Act, the Mississippi Act, unlike the Maryland Act, confers to the continuing directors of target
corporations the power to exercise greater discretion than the other directors of the board may
exercise. Id. § 79-25-7(c). Specifically, the Mississippi Act enables an interested shareholder to
avoid satisfying the supermajority voting requirements or fairness conditions of the Act if eighty
percent of the continuing directors of the target corporation approve of the business combination.
Id.; see supra note 148 and accompanying text (describing supermajority voting requirements).
Under the Mississippi Act, continuing directors are either members of the board of directors who
served on the board before the tender offeror became an interested shareholder or any directors
on the board that a majority of the disinterested board of directors elects. Miss. CODE ANN. §
79-25-7(g) (Supp. 1987). The Mississippi Act defines an interested shareholder as an owner of at
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tors may approve a business combination only before the tender offeror
least twenty percent of the outstanding voting stock of the corporation. Id. § 79-25-3(1).
In addition to conferring greater discretion to the continuing directors than to other members
of the board of directors, the Mississippi Act authorizes a corporation to opt out of the Act's
requirements by a shareholder amendment. Id. § 79-25-7(d)(ii). To opt out of the Mississippi Act,
a majority of the shareholders must vote to approve the amendment. Id. The Mississippi Act,
however, disallows the corporation from opting out of the Act's requirements after the first year
of the corporation's existence. Id. Further, the Mississippi legislature specifically included a
severability provision in the Mississippi Act. Id. § 79-25-9. The severability provision provides that
if the Mississippi Act is found invalid, the fair price provisions are severable from the rest of
Mississippi's corporate law, leaying the remainder of the Mississippi Act fully effective. Id. § 79-
25-9; see supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing severability of provisions from state
takeover laws).
NORTH CAROLiNA
In 1987 North Carolina enacted a fair price statute that the legislature named the North
Carolina Shareholder Protection Act (North Carolina Act). N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-75 to -80
(Supp. 1987). The North Carolina Act expires on June 30, 1989. N.C. Sess. Laws 1987, ch. 124,
S.3. In addition North Carolina adopted a control share statute. Id. § 55-90; see supra note 115
and accompanying text (describing North Carolina's control share statute).
Unlike the provisions of most fair price statutes, which apply only to domestic corporations,
the North Carolina Act applies both to domestic corporations and certain foreign corporations.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-75(b)(3a) (Supp. 1987); see infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text
(discussing fair price statutes that apply to foreign corporations). The Act's requirements essentially
apply to foreign corporations that have their principal place of business in North Carolina,
maintain a substantial percentage of their assets in North Carolina, and employ a substantial
number of North Carolina residents. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-75(b)(3a)(2) (Supp. 1987).
While the North Carolina Act generally contains provisions that are similar in substance to
the Maryland Act, the North Carolina Act, unlike the Maryland Act, confers to the continuing
directors the power to exercise greater discretion than the other directors of the board may exercise.
Id. § 55-78(c). The North Carolina Act confers to the continuing directors, subject to majority
approval, the authority to determine certain matters. Id. For example, the North Carolina Act
authorizes the continuing directors to determine whether a person owns twenty percent of the
voting shares and to determine the fair market value of certain assets that the corporation plans
to acquire. Id. Under the North Carolina Act, a continuing director includes both a member of
the board of directors who served on the board before the tender offeror became an interested
shareholder and any director of the board a majority of the disinterested board of directors
approves as a director. Id. § 55-75(b)(3). The North Carolina Act's fairness provisions are not
triggered unless a business combination involves an entity owning twenty percent of the corpora-
tion's voting stock. Id. § 55-76. Unlike the Maryland Act, however, the North Carolina Act does
not define an interested shareholder. See id. §§ 55-75 to -80 (failing to define interested shareholder);
supra note 146 and accompanying text (Maryland Act defines interested shareholder as person
owning more than twenty percent of corporation's stock).
In addition to conferring greater discretion upon the continuing directors than the other
members of the board of directors, the North Carolina Act requires that ninety-five percent of
the voting shares of a corporation affirmatively vote to approve any proposed business combination
with an entity holding more than twenty percent of the corporation's voting shares. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-76 (Supp. 1987); supra note 148 and accompanying text (describing supermajority
voting requirements). The North Carolina Act allows a business combination triggering the
supermajority voting requirements to avoid satisfying the voting requirements if the interested
shareholder satisfies certain stock price and nonprice conditions. Id. § 55-77; supra notes 151-57
and accompanying text (describing price conditions and nonprice conditions). Unlike most fair
price statutes, the North Carolina Act includes a nonprice condition that requires the interested
shareholder to ensure that the corporation maintains a number of continuing directors on the
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becomes an interested shareholder. 6 Second, certain states have adopted
board of directors equal to the percentage of outstanding stock that the disinterested shareholders
hold. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-77(3) (Supp. 1987). Moreover, the North Carolina Act requires the
board of directors unanimously to approve any reductions in dividend rates. Id. Further, the
North Carolina Act requires that the corporation mail proxy statements to solicit shareholder
approval of the business combination and notify the shareholders of the fairness of the terms of
the business combination. Id. § 55-77(5). The proxy statement must include a fairness opinion
prepared by an investment banking firm that the continuing directors selected. Id.
In addition to allowing business combinations to avoid the supermajority voting requirements,
the North Carolina Act exempts from the Act's provisions any sale or lease of the corporation's
assets valued at less than $5,000,000. Id. § 55-75(b)(1). The North Carolina Act, however, disallows
an existing corporation from exempting itself from the North Carolina Act. See id. § 55-79(ii)
(corporation had to opt out of North Carolina Act's provisions within ninety days of Act's
effective date). A newly formed corporation, however, may opt out of the North Carolina Act's
provisions if the corporation affirmatively states in its charter that the provisions of the North
Carolina Act do not apply. Id. § 55-79(ii).
In addition to the North Carolina Act's exemption provisions, the North Carolina legislature
specifically included a severability provision in the North Carolina Act. Id. § 55-80. The severability
provision provides that if a court finds that the North Carolina Act is invalid, the fair price
provisions are severable from the rest of the North Carolina Act, leaving the remainder of the
North Carolina Act fully effective. Id.; see also id. § 55-79.1 (describing conflict of law provision
in North Carolina Act).
PENNSYLVANIA
In 1983 Pennsylvania adopted a fair price statute referred to as the Pennsylvania Shareholder
Protection Act (Pennsylvania Act). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Purdon Supp. 1988). At the
same time, Pennsylvania adopted a control share cashout statute. Id. § 1910. The advocates of
the Pennsylvania Act, particularly the Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce, introduced the bill
to the state legislature in November 1983. See Newlin & Gilmer, The Pennsylvania Shareholder
Protection Act: A New State Approach to Deflecting Corporate Takeover Bids, 40 Bus. LAw.
111, 112 (1984) (discussing legislative history of Pennsylvania Act). With little legislative discussion
and no public debate, the Pennsylvania legislature approved the bill, and the state's governor
signed the bill into law in December 1983. Id.; Statement of Senator Lloyd, Senate's Consideration
to Concur in House Amendment of S. 1144 (December 14, 1983) (according to Senator Lloyd,
bill seemed important even though bill's proponents hurriedly were attempting to win legislature's
approval of bill); Statement of Senator Zemprelli, Pennsylvania's State Senate's Consideration on
S. 1144 (December 6, 1983) (during hearings, Zemprelli noted importance of bill and stated that
legislature did not understand how bill applies to corporations); Steinburg, State Law Developments:
The Pennsylvania Anti-Takeover Legislation, 12 SEc. REo. L.J. 184, 184-85 & n.5. While the
legislative history indicates that the legislators understood that the bill would protect shareholders,
the history of the Pennsylvania Act denotes a larger concern, which is the protection of the state's
economy from the disruptive effects of hostile takeovers. See Statement of Senator Fumo,
Pennsylvania State Senate's Consideration on S. 1144, at 1431 (Dec. 6, 1983) (bill's enactment
would have chilling effect on takeovers and protect state residents that had invested time and
money in Pennsylvania corporations). When the bill was pending in the legislature, foriegn
corporations were attempting to takeover Gulf Oil Corporation and Scott Paper Co., both
Pennsylvania corporations. See S. PAMEPINTO, supra note 7, at 18-19 (discussing legislative history
of Pennsylvania Act). One of the senator's advocating the bill's enactment, however, denied
knowing whether Scott Paper's continued existence depended on the bill's passage. See Interrogation
between Senators Fisher and Zemprelli, Pennsylvania State Senate's Consideration on S. 1144 (Dec.
6, 1983) (during hearings, Senator Zemprelli denied knowing that bill would save Scott Paper
from corporate takeover).
Although the Pennsylvania Act operates similarly to the Maryland Act, the form of the
Pennsylvania Act is simpler than the Maryland Act. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1
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fair price statutes either that do not allow corporations to opt out of the
(Purdon Supp. 1988) with MD. CoRps. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-601 to -603 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
See generally Newlin & Gilmer, supra, at 112-13 (because of bill's hurried passage, Pennsylvania
Act probably will require legislative amendments and judicial clarification). The Pennsylvania Act
confers the authority to approve a transaction with an interested shareholder upon a majority of
the members of the board of directors who do not have an equitable interest in the interested
shareholder or that served on the board of directors two years before the proposed transaction.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1(C)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1988). The Pennsylvania Act defines an
interested shareholder as a shareholder that is a party to a transaction or that is treated differently
from other shareholders. Id. § 1409.1(C). The Pennsylvania Act's definition of an interested
shareholder, however, qxcludes bankers, trustees, and shareholders that in good faith do not intend
to circumvent the purposes of the Pennsylvania Act. Id.
In addition to conferring greater discretion to the disinterested directors than the other
members of the board of directors, the Pennsylvania Act requires a majority of the disinterested
shareholders to approve a business combination. Id. § 1409.1(C). The Pennsylvania Act allows an
interested shareholder to avoid the voting requirements if the interested shareholder pays the
shareholders of the target corporation consideration in an amount that at least equals the
consideration that the interested shareholder paid the shareholders for the shares during the tender
offer. Id. § 1409.1(C)(2). In addition the Pennsylvania Act does not contain nonprice conditions.
See id. § 1409.1 (Pennsylvania Act contains no nonprice fairness requirements); supra notes 151-
57 and accompanying text (describing price and nonprice conditions). See generally Note, The
1983 Amendments to Pennsylvania's Business Corporation Law: Unconstitutional: MITE Be, 89
DiCK. L. Rsv. 401, 401-40 (1985) (describing legislative history, mechanics, and constitutionality
of Pennsylvania Act).
VIRGINIA
In 1985 Virginia enacted a fair price statute (Virginia Act). VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to -
727.1 (1985 & Supp. 1988). While the Virginia Act substantively is quite similar to the Maryland
Act, the Virginia Act significantly differs from the Maryland Act by conferring more discretion
to the disinterested board of directors in certain matters. Id. Specifically, the Virginia Act enables
the interested shareholders to avoid the supermajority voting requirements and fairness provisions
if a majority of the disinterested directors vote to exempt a business combination, defined as an
affiliated transaction, from the requirements of the Act. Id. § 13.1-727.A(l). Additionally, the
Virginia Act gives the disinterested directors, upon majority approval, the discretion to determine
whether a person satisfies the Act's definition of an interested shareholder or of an affiliate of
some other entity, and to determine other matters concerning satisfaction of the Act's definitions.
Id. § 13.1-726.1. Under the Virginia Act, a disinterested director can be either a member of the
board of directors who served on the board before the tender offeror became an interested
shareholder or any director that a majority of the disinterested board of directors approves to act
as a director. Id. § 13.1-725.
In addition to conferring greater discretion to the disinterested directors than the other
directors of the board, the Virginia Act imposes supermajority voting requirements to approve an
affiliated transactiqn. Id. § 13.1-725.1. Accordingly, the Virginia Act requires that a supermajority
of two-thirds of the disinterested shareholders and the greater of a majority or two of the
disinterested directors affirmatively vote to approve an affiliated transaction. Id. § 13.1-725.1. If
an interested shareholder, however, has held its stock in the corporation for a three year period,
the Virginia Act applies a different supermajority voting requirement. Id. §§ 13.725.1 to .726; see
infra note 131 (describing freezeout statutes). If a tender offeror holds the stock of a corporation
for a three year period that commences on the day the tender offeror becomes an interested
shareholder, 'the Virginia Act requires that a supermajority of two-thirds of the disinterested
shareholders affirmatively vote to approve the transaction (the three year supermajority vote) or
a majority of the disinterested directors affirmatively vote to approve the transaction. Id. §§ 13.1-
726, -727.A.I. So long as an interested shareholder has held the stock of the corporation for three
years, the Virginia Act also allows an interested shareholder to avoid the three year supermajority
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fair price requirements or that limit the ability of corporations to opt out
of the statute. 69 Because the Maryland Act, like the majority of fair price
voting requirements. Id. § 13.1-727. Accordingly, the interested shareholder may avoid the three
year supermajority voting requirements if the shareholder satisfies certain stock price and nonprice
conditions. Id. § 13.1-727; see supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text (describing price and
nonprice provisions). The Virginia Act specifies that the corporation must satisfy the nonprice
conditions during the three-year period ending on the date that the interested shareholder announces
the proposed affiliated transaction. VA. CoDE ANN. § 13.1-727 (1985 & Supp. 1988). Moreover,
the Virginia Act allows a corporation to opt out of the Act's requirements by amending the
bylaws or corporate charter if a majority of the disinterested shareholders approve the amendment.
Id. § 13.1-727.B.5.; see supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text (listing states that have enacted
fair price statutes containing opt out provisions). The Virginia Act, however, disallows the
amendment from becoming effective until eighteen months after the day the shareholders approved
the amendment. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727.B.5 (1985 & Supp. 1988). See generally Joynes &
Keeler, Virginia's Affiliated Transaction's Statute: Indulging Form over Substance in Second
Generation Takeover Legislation, 21 U. RiCH. L. REv. 489, 489-519 (1987) (discussing mechanics
and constitutionality of Virginia Act); Note, Virginia's Affiliated Transactions Article: The Death
of Two-7iered Takeovers in Virginia, 44 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1103, 1105-1111, 1122-1127 (1988)
(discussing mechanics and constitutionality of Virginia Act).
WASHINGrON
In 1985 Washington adopted a fair price statute (Washington Act) that is substantively similar,
but less complex in form, than the Maryland Act. WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.425 (Supp. 1988).
The Washington Act refers to a transaction between an interested shareholder and a domestic
corporation as an interested shareholder transaction. Compare id. § 23.08.4250)(a) (interested
shareholder transaction triggers Washington Act) with supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text
(business combination triggers Maryland Act). Unlike the Maryland Act, the Washington Act
requires an affirmative two-thirds vote of the disinterested shareholders to approve an interested
shareholder transaction (supermajority voting requirement). WASH. REv. CoDE § 23A.08.425(2)
(Supp. 1988); see supra note 148 and accompanying text (defining supermajority voting require-
ments). Alternatively, however, a majority of the corporation's disinterested directors may vote to
approve an interested shareholder transaction. WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.425(1)(b) (Supp. 1988).
Moreover, under the Washington Act, unlike the Maryland Act, an interested shareholder does
not have to satisfy nonprice fairness requirements to avoid satisfying the supermajority voting
requirement. See id. (Washington Act includes no nonprice conditions). In conjunction with the
fair price requirements, the Washington Act confers upon the disinterested directors the authority
to determine whether the value of the consideration that the interested shareholder proposes to
pay the minority shareholders at least equals the highest market value of the consideration paid
for shares of the same class acquired within the previous two years. Id. § 23A.08.425(3)(c). In
addition the Washington Act allows a corporation to opt out of the provisions of the Act by
amending its corporate charter if the shareholders satisfy the same supermajority voting require-
ments necessary to effectuate a business combination. Id. § 23A.08.425(3)(d); see infra notes 169-
70 and accompanying text (discussing fair price statutes with opt out provisions).
167. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-25-1 to -7(c) (Supp. 1987) (affimative vote of 80% of
disinterested directors will exempt business combination from Mississippi Act's requirements); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-727A(l) (1985 & Supp. 1988) (affimrative vote of majority of disinterested
directors will exempt business combination from Virginia Act's requirements); supra note 166
(listing and describing all state fair price statutes that confer additional discretion to disinterested
directors).
168. See MD. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 3-603(c)(1)(ii) (1985 & Supp. 1988) (authorizing
board of directors of Maryland corporation to exempt business combination from Act's requirement
before tender offeror becomes interested shareholder).
169. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.108(5)(c) (West Supp. 1988) (opt out amendment does
not apply to affiliated transaction until eighteen months after shareholders approve amendment)
1100
STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES
statutes, allows corporations to opt out of the Act's provisions, share-
holders of those corporations who opt out of the Act's requirements may
remain unprotected from the coercive effect of two-tiered takeovers.
7 0
Third, a few states, like Florida and North Carolina, have adopted fair
price statutes that apply to corporations other than domestic corpora-
tions. '7  The Maryland Act, however, like the majority of fair price
statutes, only applies to certain companies incorporated in Maryland. 7 2
While a number of states have enacted fair price statutes, a few
states-Maine, Pennsylvania, and Utah-have enacted a hybrid form of a
fair price statute referred to as a control share cashout statute. 73 Like
and Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-25-7(d)(ii) (Supp. 1987) (prohibiting corporations from opting out of
Mississippi Act's requirements after corporations' first year of incorporation) and N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-98.1 (Supp. 1987) (corporation must opt out of North Carolina Act's provisions within ninety
days of Act's effective date) and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910.A() (Purdon Supp. 1988) (same)
and VA. CODE ANr. § 13.1-727.B.5 (Supp. 1988) (opt out amendment does not apply to affiliated
transaction until eighteen months after shareholders approve amendment) with CoNN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 33-374c(d)(B) (West 1987) (containing opt out provisions) and GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-
235(a)-(b) (Supp. 1988) (corporation must amend bylaws to state that corporation elects to have
Georgia Act apply to it) and In. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85.A (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987)
(containing opt out provisions) and Ky. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-220(5)(a)2 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1988) (same) and MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 450.1775-.1784(B) (West Supp. 1988)
(same) (opt out amendment does not apply to affiliated transaction until eighteen months after
shareholders approve amendment) and WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.425(3)(d) (West Supp. 1988)
(same) and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.725(3a) ('West Supp. 1988) (same). See generally supra note
166 (describing Florida's, Mississippi's, .North Carolina's, Pennsylvania's, and Virginia's state fair
price statutes that either limit corporations' ability to opt out of fair price statute or do not
contain opt out provisions).
170. See S. PAmpn, ro, supra note 7, at 43 (if corporations opt out of Maryland Act's
requirements, shareholders are unprotected from coercive two-tiered takeovers). But see supra note
160 and accompanying text (purpose of opt out provision in Maryland Act is to encourage friendly
takeovers).
171. See FA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.108, .110 (West. Supp. 1988) (Florida Act's provisions
apply to certain foreign corporations); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-75 to -80 (Supp. 1987) (North
Carolina Act's provisions apply to certain foreign corporations); supra note 166 (describing Florida
Act's application to certain foreign corporations); supra note 166 (describing North Carolina Act's
application to certain foreign corporations).
172. See MD. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANNi. §§ 3-601 to -603 (1985 & Supp. 1988) (Maryland
Act's provisions apply to domestic corporations); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-374a to
-374c (West 1987) (Connecticut Act applies to domestic corporations); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-
232 to -235 (Supp. 1988) (effective until July 1, 1989) (recodified as amended at GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 14-2-1131 to -1133 (Special Pamphlet 1988) (effective July 1, 1989) (Georgia Act applies to
domestic corporations); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988) (Illinois Act
applies to domestic corporations); Ky. Ray. STAT. ANN. §§ 271B.12-200 to 271B.12-230 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) (Kentucky Act applies to domestic corporations); LA. Ry. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12:132 to -134 (West Supp. 1988) (Louisiana Act applies to domestic corporations); MicH.
Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 450.1775-.1784 (West Supp. 1988) (Michigan Act applies to domestic
corporations); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-25-I to -7 (Supp. 1987) (Mississippi Act applies to domestic
corporations); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Purdon Supp. 1988) (Pennsylvania Act applies
to domestic corporations); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to -727.1 (Supp. 1988) (Virginia Act applies
to domestic corporations).
173. See ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910 (Supp. 1987) (control share cashout statute);
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fair price statutes, control share cashout statutes require a tender offeror
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1988) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-6-120)
(Advance Code Serv. 1988) (same). The control share cashout statutes resemble heightened
dissenter's right of appraisal statutes. See S. Shapiro & J. Strauss, Breathing New Life into State
Takeover Statutes 457, 482 (1987) (referring to control share cashout statutes as heightened
appraisal statutes); supra note 131 (discussing dissenting shareholders' right to appraisal).
MAINE
In 1985 Maine adopted a control share cashout statute (Maine Control Share Cashout Act).
ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910 (Supp. 1987). The provisions of the Maine Control Share
Cashout Act apply to any domestic corporation unless the corporation does not have any voting
shares registered on a national securities exchange or with the SEC. Id. § 910.14.A. A shareholder's
acquisition of twenty-five percent of the shares of a Maine corporation (control transaction)
triggers the requirements of the Maine Control Share Cashout Act. Id. § 910.2. The Maine Control
Share Cashout Act defines any shareholder or group of shareholders having voting power of at
least twenty-five percent of the shares of a target corporation as a controlling person. Id. §
910.2.A. When a shareholder assumes the status of a controlling person, in a control transaction,
the Maine Control Share Cashout Act requires the controlling person to notify the shareholders
within fifteen days of the date of the control transaction that a control transaction has taken
place. Id. § 910.3. The Maine Control Share Cashout Act requires that the controlling person
inform the shareholders that the shareholders have thirty days to exercise their right to demand,
in writing, that the control person pay the shareholders cash for the target shares. Id. § 910.4.
The control person must pay any shareholder demanding payment for its shares an amount equal
to the fair value of the shares based on the value of the shares the day before the control
transaction occurred. Id. § 910.5. The control person has ten days to make a written offer to pay
the shareholder for the shares. Id. § 910.7. If the control person and the shareholder demanding
payment for the shares of the target corporation cannot agree as to the fair value of the shares
within thirty days, the Maine Control Share Cashout Act authorizes a state court to determine
the value of the shares. Id. § 910.9.
PENNSYLVANIA
In 1983 Pennsylvania adopted a control share cashout statute (Pennsylvania Control Share
Cashout Act). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1988); see supra note 166 (discussing
legislative history of Pennsylvania Act). In addition, Pennsylvania adopted a fair price statute. See
supra note 166 (describing provisions of Pennsylvania's fair price statute). The Pennsylvania
Control Share Cashout Act generally applies to any domestic corporation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15
§ 1910.G (Purdon Supp. 1988). The Pennsylvania Control Share Cashout Act, however, does not
apply if the corporation does not have any voting shares registered with the SEC, is a subsidiary
of the target corporation, or is a shareholder that inadvertently acquires enough shares of stock
to become a control person. Id. § 1910.G. A shareholder's acquisition of thirty percent of the
shares of a Pennsylvania corporation triggers the requirements of the Pennsylvania Control Share
Cashout Act. Id. § 1910.B. The Pennsylvania Control Share Cashout Act defines any shareholder
or group of shareholders having voting power of at least thirty percent of the shares of a target
corporation as a controlling person. Id. § 1910.B. When a shareholder assumes the status of a
controlling person in a control transaction, the Pennsylvania Control Share Cashout Act requires
the controlling person promptly to notify the shareholders that a control transaction has taken
place. Id. § 1910.C. The Pennsylvania Control Share Cashout Act requires the controlling person
to state in the notice that the shareholders are entitled to demand payment for their shares within
a certain period of time. Id. § 1910.C,.D. In addition the Pennsylvania Control Share Act requires
the controlling person to file a petition with the court of common pleas located in the county
where the corporation has a registered office for a definition of the fair value of the shares. Id.
§ 1910.C. The controlling person must pay any shareholder demanding payment for the shares in
the target corporation cash in an amount equal to the fair value of the shares. Id. § 1910.E. The
Pennsylvania Control Share Cashout Act fixes the fair value of the shares based on the value of
the shares on the day before the control transaction took place. Id. The Pennsylvania Control
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to pay minority shareholders of a target corporation a fair price for shares
of the target corporation, but only to any shareholder that demands a
fair price. 174 Control share cashout statutes do not impose supermajority
voting requirements or nonprice conditions on the tender offeror, but
explicitly provide that if the parties disagree over the fair value of the
shares of a corporation, a court may decide the value of the shares.1
75
Although numerous states have enacted fair price statutes, the United
States Supreme Court has not yet addressed the constitutionality of fair
price statutes. 7 6 The reasoning of the Supreme Court in CTS and MITE,
Share Cashout Statute also provides that the fair value of a share must be a value at least as
high as the price the controlling person paid for the shares within ninety days of the control
transaction. Id. If the control person and the shareholder demanding payment for the shares of
the target corporation cannot agree on the fair value of the shares, the Pennsylvania Control
Share Cashout Act authorizes the court to appoint an appraiser to determine the value of the
shares. Id. § 1910.E. Once the shareholders have surrendered the shares, the controlling person
must pay cash for the shares. Id. § 1910.E.
UTAH
In 1987 Utah adopted a simplified control share cashout statute that the legislature incorporated
in Utah's control share statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-6-12 (Advanced Code Serv. 1988)
(containing Utah's control share cash out statute); supra note 99 (describing mechanics of Utah's
control share statute). The cashout component of Utah's control share statute applies if a tender
offeror becomes a controlling person by acquiring at least a majority of the voting shares of the
corporation. UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-6120) (Advance Code Serv. 1988). Once the tender offeror
acquires a majority interest in the corporation, the Utah Act requires the board of directors of
the target corporation to notify the shareholders that they are entitled to demand that the tender
offeror pay them the fair value for their shares in the corporation. Id. §§ 61-6-12(2); see id. §§
16-10-75 to -76 (describing shareholders' right to dissent under Utah law). The Utah Act defines
a share's fair value as the highest price that the tender offeror paid for the shares before the
tender offeror became a controlling person. Id. § 61-6-12(3).
174. See supra note 173 (listing states that have enacted control share cashout statutes and
describing provisions of control share cashout statutes that require tender offeror to pay fair price
to minority shareholders for shares of target corporation). While control share cashout statutes
require a tender offeror to pay minority shareholders a fair price for their shares in the target
corporation, control share cashout statutes do not require the tender offeror to comply with any
pricing formula to determine the fair value of the shares of the target corporation. Compare supra
and accompanying text (stating that control share cashout statutes require tender offeror to pay
shareholder fair price for shares if shareholder demands payment for shares) with supra notes
153-154 and accompanying text (stating that fair price statutes require interested shareholders to
pay fair price based on pricing formula). Unlike the requirements of fair price statutes, the
requirements of control share cashout statutes do not apply unless a target shareholder demands
payment of the fair value of the shares of the target corporation. Compare supra note 153 and
accompanying text (stating that fair price statutes require interested shareholders to pay fair price
for shares unless interested shareholder satisfies supermajority voting requirement) with supra and
accompanying text (stating that control share cashout statutes require tender offeror to pay fair
price if shareholder demands to be paid fair price).
175. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910.9 (Supp. 1987) (if parties disagree over fair value
of stock, court shall determine stock's value); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910.E (Purdon Supp.
1988) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-6-12 (Advance Code Serv. 1988) (same).
176. See Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 131, at 279 (noting that Supreme Court has not yet
addressed constitutionality of fair price statutes). But see CrS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am.,
107 S. Ct. 1637, 1652 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of Indiana's control share statute); Edgar
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however, suggests that most of the states' fair price statutes will survive
a preemption test analysis under the Williams Act and do not impermis-
sively burden interstate commerce. 177 The Williams Act does not preempt
state fair price statutes because the Williams Act and the fair price statutes
apply to two distinct aspects of two-tiered takeovers. 17 8 The Williams Act
regulates and governs tender offers in two ways.'7 9 First, a tender offeroi
must file a statement with the SEC disclosing certain substantive matters,
including the tender offeror's identity, financial arrangements for the
proposed takeover, and purpose of the purchase. 80 Second, the Williams
Act establishes certain procedural rules aimed at making the tender offer
process more equitable.181 In form at least, fair price statutes, however,
v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982) (holding Illinois' first generation takeover statute
unconstitutional); also Gunter v. AGO Int'l B. V., 533 F. Supp. 86, 90 (N.D. Fla. 1981) (Florida
takeover statute found unconstitutional); Natomas Co. V. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191, 193 (N.D.
Nev. 1981) (Nevada takeover statute found unconstitutional); Seagram & Sons Inc. v. Marley,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. § 98,246 (W.D. Okla. 1981) (Oklahoma takeover statute found unconstitutional);
Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782, 788 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (granting preliminary injunction to
plaintiff on finding that plaintiff substantially likely to succeed in constitutional challenge to
Pennsylvania takeover statute found unconstitutional); AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp.
929, 941 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (Ohio takeover statute found constitutional); Brascan Ltd. v. Lassiter,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. § 98,247 (E.D. La. 1979) (Louisiana takeover statute found unconstitutional);
Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 14 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Delaware takeover statute
found unconstitutional).
177. See infra notes 178-196, 209-225, 233-241 and accompanying text (describing why Williams
Act generally does not preempt fair price statutes). But see infra notes 197-208, 226-232 and
accompanying text (discussing constitutional problems with certain states' fair price statutes).
178. Compare infra notes 179-81 and accompanying text (discussing application of Williams
Act to tender offeror during tender offer) with infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (discussing
application of fair price statutes to interested shareholder). In addition to applying to different
aspects of a two-tiered tender offer than the Williams Act, the provisions of fair price statutes
encompass state fiduciary law principles. See Sante Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-79
(1977) (freezeout of subsidiary by parent corporation constituted corporate conduct that most
states traditionally regulate).
179. See infra notes 180-82 (describing how Williams Act governs tender offers).
180. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982); see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (discussing
requirements of Williams Act). Under the Williams Act, a tender offeror must accept tendered
shares on a pro rata basis. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982). In requiring a tender offeror to accept
the shares on a pro rata basis, Congress intended to reduce the pressure that a shareholder feels
during a tender offer to tender his shares before the other shareholders close him out and take
advangage of the premium price. See 114 CONG. Rac. 24664 (daly ed. Aug. 30, 1967) (statement
of Sen. Williams) (Congress intended full disclosure requirements to protect investors during tender
offers). Moreover, the SEC has promulgated rules to extend the time that shareholders have to
decide whether to tender their shares. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1984). The SEC, in promulgating
the rules, intended to give shareholders more time to consider the independent merits of tendering
shares to the raider. Proposed Pro Rata Rule, SEC Securiting Exchange Act Release No. 18761
[1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) § 83222 (May 25, 1982); supra notes 28-35, 54-
74 and accompanying text (describing purposes of Williams Act). The Williams Act attempts to
ensure that investor-shareholders obtain all relevant information to make informed decisions as to
whether to tender their shares in a target corporation to a tender offeror. Id.




typically regulate post-acquisition mergers between an interested share-
holder and a corporation. l 2 If a tender offeror, however, attempts a two-
tiered takeover, the offeror must comply only with the Williams Act
during the first phase of the takeover attempt by fully disclosing the terms
of the tender offer.'1 If the tender offeror successfully acquires a con-
trolling interest in the target corporation during the tender offer, and then
desires to consummate a two-tiered tender offer by effectuating a merger,
the tender offeror then must comply with the requirements of the fair
price statute.8 4 If the tender offeror decides not to proceed to the merger
phase of the two-tiered takeover, or the tender offeror does not satisfy
the fair price statute's definition of an interested shareholder, the provi-
sions of the fair price statute do not apply to the offeror. 85 At least
facially, fair price statutes do not conflict with the provisions of the
Williams Act because fair price statutes impose neither procedural nor
substantive requirements on tender offerors or the process of tender
offers.8 6 As a result, tender offerors can comply with both the Williams
Act and any applicable fair price statute because the Williams Act and
fair price statutes are designed to regulate two distinct aspects of a takeover
attempt.
8 7
While fair price statutes directly regulate only the merger phase of a
two-tiered takeover, fair price statutes indirectly may regulate tender offers
by making takeovers more expensive for tender offerors, thus reducing
the aggregate level of takeover activity. 88 Fair price statutes, therefore,
may deter some takeover attempts by requiring a tender offeror to pay
182. See Scriggins & Clarks, supra note 131, at 287 & n.122 (Maryland's fair price statute
makes no attempt to regulate tender offers); supra notes 142-62 and accompanying text (describing
mechanics of fair price statutes). But see 1 M. LPoN & E. STMNBERGER, supra note 133, §
9.04(1), at 9-25 to -26 (discussing SEC's contemplation that SEC's rules regulate merger phase of
two-tiered takeover). In Radol v. Thomas the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio noted that case law as well as SEC rules and regulations contemplate that two-tiered
tender offers take place. Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (S.D. Ohio 1982). While the
Radol court refused to find that SEC rule 13e-3 validated two-tiered tender offers, the court also
refused to find financing of the two-tiered takeover manipulative. Id.
183. See supra notes 5-6, 179-82 and accompanying text (describing disclosure and other
procedural requirements of Williams Act).
184. See supra notes 144-62 and accompanying text (describing mechanics of fair price
statutes and conditions with which interested shareholder must comply to effectuate merger).
185. See Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 131, at 272-273 & n.27 (noting that purpose of fair
price statutes is to ameliorate inequities of two-tiered takeovers, and that fair price statutes apply
only to transactions involving conflict of interest or requiring shareholder approval).
186. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1648 (1987) (Williams
Act does not preempt Indiana takeover statute because statute regulates traditional functions of
state common law); Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 131, at 289 (concluding that Maryland fair
price statute does not preempt Williams Act).
187. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1644 (1987) (Williams
Act preempts state law if tender offeror finds compliance with both federal and state law
impossible); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (same).
188. Cf. supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (Maryland Act only regulates merger
phase of two-tiered takeover).
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more for a corporation's shares than the tender offeror otherwise would
be willing to pay. 89 Consequently, shareholders may receive fewer oppor-
tunities for the premiums associated with hostile bids. 190 Moreover, fair
price statutes may lessen the role that takeovers play in enhancing diligence
and accountability.
19
In spite of the benefits of takeover activity, the Supreme Court in
CTS, in upholding Indiana's control share statute, reasoned that even
though state takeover statutes may make a tender offer more expensive
and, therefore, deter takeovers, the Williams Act does not preempt state
takeover statutes so long as the statute does not unduly favor manage-
ment.'92 The Court in CTS noted that Congress intended the Williams Act
to protect investor-shareholders, while the plurality in MITE implied that
state takeover statutes should treat evenhandedly shareholders, tender
offerors and management of target corporations. 193 While the Williams
189. See Toms, Compensating Shareholders Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78 CoLuM.
L. REv. 548, 571-72 (1978) (fair price statutes deter two-tiered takeovers).
190. See id. at 566-568, 572 & n.83 (noting that mergers may benefit shareholders and
promote efficient management); infra note 225 (noting benefits of takeover activity).
191. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (noting benefits of takeover activity).
192. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text (discussing CTS Court's reasoning in
finding that Williams Act does not preempt certain takeover statutes).
193. See Full Disclosure of Corp. Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids:
Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 178, 184 (1967) (discussing legislative history of Williams Act
and stating that Williams Act's purpose is to protect investor-shareholders from being pawns to
tender offeror and management), quoted in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 33-
35 (1977); supra notes 28-35, 54-74 and accompanying text (describing purposes of Williams Act).
Courts and commentators interpret the Williams Act's purpose in protecting investor-shareolders
differently. See Note, supra note 133, at 449 (noting that disagreement exists as to meaning of
investor-shareholder protection under Williams Act). The proponents of the market approach
contend that Congress, in part, intended for the Williams Act to protect the investor-shareholders.
See Note, supra note 133, at 452-54 (describing market view of Williams Act). Proponents of the
market view approach, however, contend that protection of investor is intermingled and on the
same parity as Congress' intent to maintain a neutral balance between the tender offeror and
target management. Id. The market view approach, therefore, suggests that states must play a
narrower role in regulating tender offers because state regulation threatens to upset the balance
among management, tender offeror, and investor-shareholders under the Williams Act. Id. at 454.
On the other hand, some commentators advocate the need for more state regulation in order to
provide sufficient investor protection under the Williams Act. See Scriggins & Clarke, supra note
133, at 286-87 (stating need for Maryland Act, in addition to Williams Act, to protect investor-
shareholders).
In addition to courts and commentators disagreeing over the meaning of investor-shareholder
protection and, accordingly, the need for state takeover legislation, commentators criticize the
requirements of fair price statutes that enable the interested shareholder to pay the minority
shareholder a price that at least equals the amount which the interested shareholder paid the
shareholder during the tender offer. Note, supra note 133, at 464. Critics of fair price statutes
argue that the pro rata provision of the Williams Act and SEC rule 14d-8 attempt to insure that
all shareholders participate equally in the tender offer phase of a two-tiered takeover. Id.; see
Green, Nathan & Gelford, The SEC Adopts a More Rational Proration Rule, in NEw T)EcHnQuEs
IN AcQuismoNs & TAKEovERs 79, 82-113 (1983) (discussing Rule 14-d-8). Fair price statutes attempt
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Act attempts to give shareholders the time and information that investors
require to evaluate the merits of a tender offer, fair price statutes recognize
that shareholders resume an inferior position after the tender offer oc-
curs. 194 In allowing minority shareholders to vote as a group during the
second phase of a takeover attempt, fair price statutes protect shareholders
against cohesive bids and maintain the equal positions that shareholders,
corporate management, and tender offerors have during a tender offer
throughout the merger phase of a two-tiered takeover.' Accordingly,
based on the preemption test analysis of CTS, fair price statutes do not
conflict with the provisions of the Williams Act because the statutes confer
to shareholders the right to vote as a group to decide the merits of a
proposed merger if a tender offeror does not comply with the fairness
requirements 196
While the Williams Act does not appear to preempt most of the fair
price statutes, courts may find that the Williams Act does preempt state
fair price statutes that confer upon disinterested directors more discretion
to ensure that a tender offeror will pay the shareholders the same price for a target corporation's
shares during the merger phase as the tender offeror paid the shareholders during the tender offer.
Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 131, at 277-278. To the critics of fair price statutes, the fair price
requirements deter tender offerors from commencing a two-tiered takeover. Note, supra note 133,
at 465. As a result, critics contend that fair price statutes violate the neutrality effect that the
Williams Act attempts to achieve because management benefits at the tender offeror's expense.
Id.
194. See supra notes 28-35, 54-74 and accompanying text (describing how Williams Act
attempts to protect investor-shareholders and place shareholders on parity with management and
tender offeror); supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text (stating that two-tiered takeovers
pressure shareholders to tender their shares); supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text (describing
how fair price statutes attempt to eliminate coercive effect of two-tiered tender offers on
shareholders by requiring interested shareholder to pay fair price or satisfy supermajority voting
requirement).
195. Compare notes 144-162 and accompanying text (describing mechanics of fair price
statutes); with supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text (discussing Court's reasoning in MITE
holding Illinois' first generation takeover statute unconstitutional because statute imposes certain
timing and disclosure requirements on bidder in conflict with Williams Act). While fair price
statutes do not seem to conflict with the provisions of the Williams Act, the control share cashout
statutes may violate the preemption doctrine. S. PAM~nmrro, supra note 7, at 43. Courts may find
that control share cashout statutes violate the preemption doctrine because the statutes do not
allow shareholders to vote as a group to determine the fairness or independent merits of a tender
offeror's offer. Id.; see supra note 173 (citing Pennsylvania, Maine and Utah as control share
cashout statutes). Rather, the control share cashout statutes enable each shareholder to determine
the fairness of the price. See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text (control share cashout
statutes require tender offeror only to pay fair price to shareholders so demanding). Because the
CTS Court emphasized the importance of shareholders voting as a group, courts may find control
share cashout statutes unconstitutional. See S. PamEwiNo, supra note 7, at 43 (stating that control
share cashout statutes may violate preemption doctrine). As a result, courts applying the analysis
of the CTS Court may find that the Williams Act preempts control share cashout statutes because
the cashout statutes do not provide shareholders with investor protection by allowing the share-
holders to vote collectively. Id.
196. See supra notes 148-57 and accompanying text (describing mechanics of supermajority
voting requirements and fairness provisions).
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than the Maryland Act confers. 197 Courts applying the analysis of the
plurality in MITE may find that these statutes upset the balance that the
Williams Act establishes between management and the tender offeror and,
therefore, strengthen management's position in an offeror's takeover at-
tempt. 98 In addition courts may find that management's strengthened
position under these fair price statutes erodes investor-shareholder's au-
tonomy, which the CTS Court stated shareholders should maintain under
takeover statutes. 199 For example, the Georgia Act disallows an interested
shareholder from consummating a business combination unless all of the
disinterested directors in the target corporation approve the business com-
bination or, alternatively, two-thirds of the disinterested directors and a
majority of the disinterested shareholders approve the business combina-
tion.200 Moreover, several state fair price statutes confer upon disinterested
directors of target corporations the discretion to determine certain matters,
such as whether a person holds ten percent or more of the corporation's
stock and, therefore, constitutes an interested shareholder.
20
While certain fair price statutes contain provisions that confer upon
disinterested directors greater discretion than the Maryland Act confers,
any increase in the disinterested director's position over the tender offeror's
seems slight. 20 2 The tender offeror always may attempt to take over a
197. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text (discussing fair price statutes that confer
additional discretion to disinterested directors); infra notes 198-205 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing constitutionality of fair price statutes that confer greater discretion to disinterested directors).
198. Compare supra notes 178-87 and accompanying text (noting that Williams Act does
not preempt fair price statutes because Williams Act and fair price statutes regulate two distinct
aspects of two-tiered takeovers, and fair price statutes foster purpose of Williams Act because fair
price statutes protect investor-shareholders) with infra notes 206-208, 226-32 and accompanying
text (discussing why provisions that some fair price statutes contain may preempt Williams Act).
199. See supra notes 54-74 and accompanying text (discussing CTS Court's analysis of Williams
Act and noting that purpose of Act is to protect investor-shareholder).
200. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text (describing provisions in Georgia Act,
and other states' fair price statutes, that confer greater discretion to disinterested directors than
to other members of board of directors).
201. See supra note 166 (describing provisions in certain fair price statutes that confer to
disinterested directors authority-to determine whether certain provisions and definitions of statute
are satisfied).
202. Cf. S. Pmvinrro, supra note 7, at 43 (noting that takeover statutes may have
constitutionality problems if statutes fail to provide shareholder protection). While the elevation
in a disinterested director's position in relation to a tender offeror's may seen slight under certain
fair price statutes, the Supreme Court in CTS emphasized the importance of shareholders collectively
voting to determine the merits of a change in voting control of the corporation. CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1646 (1987); supra notes 54-74 and accompanying text
(emphasizing importance of collective voting of shareholders). Because the disinterested directors
obtain more discretion than the directors who the interested shareholder elected to serve on the
board obtain, the tender offeror and the shareholders both may be at a disadvantage in attempting
to effectuate a business combination. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text (describing
additional discretion conferred to disinterested directors under certain fair price statutes). A court
may be more likely to find such a fair price statute unconstitutional if the statute's supermajority
voting requirements require the disinterested directors, as well as the shareholders, to approve the
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corporation by satisfying the fairness requirements of a state fair price
statute and, therefore, avoid confronting management's strengthened po-
sition under the statute. 203 Alternatively, the tender offeror may effectuate
a friendly takeover so that the directors will approve the merger, or the
tender offeror may offer to purchase enough stock to satisfy the super-
majorityvoting requirements. 2°4 Fair price statutes that confer additional
discretion to disinterested directors, therefore, do not appear to conflict
with the intent of the Williams Act, suggested under the analysis of the
plurality in MITE, because fair price statutes do not substantively upset
the balance of power between the tender offeror and management.
205
In addition to those fair price statutes which contain provisions that
may favor the management of a target corporation, some fair price statutes
enable corporations to opt out of the statutes' coverage. 20 6 In allowing
corporations the opportunity to opt out of fair price statutes, those statutes
protect only shareholders of corporations involved in two-tiered takeovers
that have not opted out of the statutes' provisions. 207 Accordingly, courts
applying the analysis of the plurality in MITE could find that fair price
statutes which include opt out provisions fail to provide evenhanded
protection to all shareholders and, therefore, contravene the Williams
Act's purpose of equalizing the position of shareholders with the positions
of the management of target corporations and tender offerors. 208 Con-
business combinations. See supra note 166 (discussing supermajority voting requirements contained
in fair price statutes conferring greater discretion to disinterested directors); supra note 131
(discussing corporate law provisions concerning interested transactionsand directors' conflict of
interest). In finding such a fair price statute unconstitutional, a court might reason that a statute
providing the disinterested directors with additional discretion preempts the purpose of the Williams
Act to provide an evenhanded approach to management and tender offerors. See supra notes 28-
35 and accompanying text (purpose of Williams Act is to provide evenhanded approach).
203. See supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text (describing how interested shareholder
can avoid satisfying supermajority voting requirements if interested shareholder complies with price
and nonprice conditions).
204. See Scriggins & Clarke, supra note 131, at 275 (legislature included opt out provision
in fair price statute to encourage friendly negotiations of takeover); supra note 148 and accom-
panying text (discussing requirement that interested shareholder satisfy supermajority voting re-
quirement before consummating business combination).
205. See supra notes 202-204 and accompanying text (explaining why Williams Act does not
preempt fair price statutes that confer additional discretion to disinterested directors).
206. See supra notes 169-170 and accompanying text (listing and describing fair price statutes
with opt out provisions).
207. See S. PMmPnnro, supra note 7, at 43 (suggesting that fair price statutes with opt out
provisions may violate preemption doctrine because such fair price statutes fail to provide
evenhanded approach to all shareholders).
208. See supra notes 206-207 and accompanying text (suggesting that, because opt out
provisions in fair price statutes do not provide evenhanded approach to management and tender
offeror, Williams Act preempts those fair price statutes); supra notes 28-35, 54-74 and accompanying
text (discussing purpose of Williams Act). At least one commentator has determined that the
Williams Act preempts fair price statutes because fair price statutes impose substantive requirements
on the corporation rather than allowing the corporation the election of amending the charter to
include similar requirements. See Note, supra note 133, at 462-63 & n.60 (concluding that Williams
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versely, under the supermajority voting requirements of a fair price statute,
shareholders vote as a group during the merger phase of a two-tiered
takeover to pass judgment on the fairness of a tender offeror's proposed
price. 20 9 Accordingly, a state defending the constitutionality of its fair
price statute might apply the preemption analysis of the CTS Court and
contend that the shareholders also should be able to decide as a group
whether they want the protection of a fair price statute. 210 Courts, there-
fore, could find that the Williams Act does not preempt fair price statutes
with opt out provisions because the shareholders vote as a group to
determine whether they want the protection of fair price statutes, just as
the shareholders vote as a group to determine the fairness of a tender
offeror's proposed offer.
211
In addition to withstanding constitutional scrutiny under the preemp-
tion analysis, fair price statutes also appear to withstand scrutiny under
the commerce clause analysis of the CTS Court. 2 2 Even though fair price
statutes seem to withstand scrutiny under the commerce clause, however,
fair price statutes arguably do hamper takeover transactions taking place
in interstate commerce. 2 3 A potential tender offeror may be reluctant to
initiate a two-tiered takeover of a corporation incorporated in a state that
has enacted a fair price statute, particularly if the statute confers greater
discretion to a corporation's disinterested directors, because the tender
offeror realizes that obtaining a controlling block of shares will be more
difficult to achieve than if the state had not enacted a fair price statute. 21 4
Act preempts Maryland Act because Maryland Act violates investor-shareholders' autonomy by
imposing supermajority voting requirements on corporations); supra note 131 (describing certain
provisions allowed by states' corporate law, that corporations traditionally have elected to include
in their charters). Conversely, fair price statutes with opt out provisions may provide shareholders
with investor autonomy. Cf. Note, supra note 133, at 462-63 (although concluding that Maryland
Act does not provide shareholder with investor autonomy, failing to comment on opt out provision
in Maryland Act).
209. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing supermajority voting requirements
that fair price statutes contain).
210. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1636, 1646 (1987) (emphasizing
that shareholders should vote as group to ensure their protection from coerciveness of two-tiered
takeover).
211. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text (explaining how Williams Act applies
evenhandedly to management and tender offeror and provides protection to investor-shareholders).
If courts address the issue of whether the Williams Act preempts fair price statutes with opt out
provisions, courts may find that the statutes do not conflict with the Williams Act or the Williams
Act's purpose because fair price statutes regulate the merger phase of a takeover and not the
tender offer. See supra notes 178-87 and accompanying text (discussing how fair price statutes
and Williams Act apply to two distinct aspects of two-tiered takeover attempts).
212. See infra notes 213-232 and accompanying text (discussing constitutionality of fair price
statutes under commerce clause).
213. See infra notes 214-16, 226-32 and accompanying text (describing how fair price statutes
burden interstate commerce).
214. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text (explaining how fair price statutes make
takeovers more difficult and expensive for tender offerors); supra note 166 (listing and describing




In addition fair price statutes increase the costs of two-tiered takeovers
because a tender offeror must pay all shareholders a premium price for
the corporation's shares during the second phase of a two-tiered takeo-
ver. 21 5 Fair price statutes, therefore, place a burden on interstate commerce
by making a takeover more difficult and expensive for a tender offeror.
21 6
Although fair price statutes may burden interstate commerce, the
Supreme Court in CTS specifically stated that even if takeover legislation
deters takeovers, takeover legislation does not necessarily violate the com-
merce clause. 217 While fair price statutes may hinder interstate commerce,
the statutes hinder it by governing shareholders' voting rights, which is a
legitimate exercise of states' established authority to govern domestic
corporations' internal affairs. 2 8 Moreover, like state corporate laws that
provide dissenting shareholders with a right of appraisal, fair price statutes
and fair price cashout statutes attempt to ensure that shareholders receive
fair prices for their shares. 2 9 Applying the reasoning of the CTS Court,
fair price statutes do not discriminate against interstate commerce because
the provisions of the statutes apply to both resident and nonresident
persons attempting to effectuate two-tiered takeovers of corporations
governed by the statutes. 220 Fair price statutes protect shareholders by
insuring that shareholders have the opportunity independently to evaluate
the merits of the merger proposal of a two-tiered takeover. 22' States
traditionally have had an interest in promoting stable relationships among
parties involved with domestic corporations and in ensuring that share-
215. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (describing price conditions under fair price
statute that ensure that interested shareholder does not freezeout minority shareholders by forcing
them to accept price in merger phase of tender offer that is less than price offered shareholders
during tender offer).
216. See supra notes 212-15 and accompanying text (fair price statutes burden interstate
commerce by making takeovers more difficult for tender offerors).
217. See supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text (discussing Court's holding in CTS that
Indiana's takeover legislation was consistent with commerce clause even though legislation burdened
interstate commerce).
218. See supra note 131 (describing provisions of states' corporate laws and noting that state
corporate laws traditionally have regulated mergers and shareholders' voting rights); supra notes
171-72 and accompanying text (discussing state statutes that apply to foreign corporations).
219. See supra note 131 (corporate law traditionally has regulated mergers and shareholders'
voting rights); supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text (control share cashout statutes, like
corporate law that provides for dissenters' right to appraisal, provide for courts to determine fair
value of shares of corporation when parties are unable to agree).
220. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing Court's holding in CTS that
Indiana takeover statute did not discriminate against interstate commerce because statute's provi-
sions applied equally to resident and nonresident tender offerors).
221. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text (noting that legislatures enact fair price
statutes to enable shareholders independently to evaluate merits of corporate takeover). In allowing
shareholders to evaluate the independent merits of a takeover proposal, shareholders may consider
the disruptive effect a takeover may have on a state's economy. See Sargent, Do the Second
Generation Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce Clause?, 8 CoRp. L. REv. 3, 16-17 (discussing
states' interest in regulating internal affairs of corporations).
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holders maintain an effective voice in corporate affairs. 222 Fair price
statutes also do not create a risk that states inconsistently will regulate
tender offers because fair price statutes directly regulate only the merger
phase of two-tiered takeovers.223 States historically have regulated mergers
between their domestic corporations and foreign corporations. 224 Conse-
quently, under the reasoning of the plurality in MITE, fair price statutes
generally should withstand a commerce clause analysis because the states'
legitimate interests in protecting shareholders outweigh the burdens that
fair price statutes impose on interstate commerce. 225
While states traditionally have had an interest in promoting stable
relationships among parties involved with domestic corporations, the pro-
visions of the Florida and North Carolina Acts apply to foreign corpo-
rations as well as domestic corporations. 226 In the event that a tender
offeror attacks the constitutionality of a fair price statute that applies to
foreign corporations, the state probably would contend that the statute
only applies to foreign corporations with substantial assets and influence
in the state. 227 The state accordingly might argue that the state has a
222. See supra note 75-90 and accompanying text (in upholding takeover statute, CTS Court
noted that states traditionally have interest in ensuring that investor-shareholders maintain effective
input in corporate affairs).
223. See supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's holding in
CTS that Indiana Act did not overly burden interstate commerce because Act did not impose
inconsistent regulations on tender offerors).
224. See supra note 131 (stating that states historically have regulated mergers).
225. See supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text (explaining why fair price statutes do not
violate commerce clause). Some commentators reject the argument that fair price statutes requiate
a legitimate state interest and, therefore, do not violate the commerce clause on the basis of the
efficient capital market hypothesis. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of Target
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HAgv. L. REv. 1161, 1165 (1981) (assuming
that efficient capital markets exist, shareholders will be better off if management does not resist
tender offer). The efficient capital market hypothesis postulates that stock prices accurately reflect
the value of a corporation's stock based on all available public information. Id. at 1165-66. The
proponents of the efficient capital market hypothesis argue that shareholders benefit from a tender
offer because a tender offeror pays them a premium price for the shareholders' shares and
reallocates corporate resources that incumbent management has misapplied. See id. at 1173 (stating
that tender offerors monitor management of corporations to insure corporate efficiency). Even
though the tender offeror may force minority shareholders to accept a price for their shares less
than the premium paid during the tender offer, the proponents of the efficient capital market
hypothesis contend that the price difference is the cost of the tender offeror monitoring the
efficiency of the corporation's management for the shareholder. See id. at 1173 n.33 (referring to
cost of tender offerors monitoringcorporation's efficiency as agency costs). But see CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1636, 1651 (1987) (stating that Constitution does not bind
states to adhere to any particular economic theory in enacting takeover statutes).
226. See supra note 166 (discussing application of Florida Act to certain foreign corporations);
supra note 166 (discussing application of North Carolina Act to certain foreign corporations);
infra notes 227-32 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional ramifications of North Carolina
and Florida Acts' potential application to certain foreign corporations).
227. See supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning of Supreme Court
in CTS that takeover statutes which apply to foreign corporations burden interstate commerce and
are unconstitutional); supra note 166 and accompanying text (Florida Act applies to foreign
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legitimate interest in regulating takeovers of those foreign corporations
because a takeover significantly would affect the state's economy. 228 Be-
cause states traditionally have not regulated foreign corporations, however,
courts probably will find that fair price statutes which apply to foreign
corporations per se violate the commerce clause. 229 Notably, the Supreme
Court in CTS stated in dicta that state takeover legislation which applies
to foreign corporations would restrict interstate commerce. 2 0 If courts
uphold fair price statutes that apply to foreign corporations, some cor-
porations potentially would be subject to the corporate laws of the cor-
poration's resident state, as well as the laws of any other state that has
enacted a fair price statute that applies to foreign corporations. 23' Courts,
therefore, probably will invalidate fair price statutes that apply to foreign
corporations because the statutes potentially will subject the corporation
to varying and possibly conflicting state regulations.
232
Although fair price statutes that apply to foreign corporations might
fail constitutional scrutiny, other fair price statutes appear constitutional
under both a preemption test analysis and a commerce clause analysis.
233
The Williams Act does not appear to preempt fair price statutes because
the Williams Act regulates tender offers and fair price statutes regulate
mergers.234 A tender offeror can comply with both the Williams Act and
a fair price statute in the offeror's attempt to take over a corporation.
21
corporation that has authority to do business in Florida, that has minimum of one hundred
shareholders, that maintains principal place of business or substantial assets in Florida, that
employs over five hundred Florida residents, that pays over $5,000,000 in payroll to Florida
employees and that has certain number of Florida residents holding stock in foreign corporation);
supra note 166 and accompanying text (North Carolina Act applies to foreign corporations that
maintain principal places of business and substantial assets in North Carolina, that employ
significant number of North Carolina residents and that at least ten percent of corporations' shares
are held by North Carolinia residents).
228. See Sargent, supra note 221, at 22-24 (suggesting that states have significant interest in
regulating internal affairs of corporation if corporation has substantial influence in state).
229. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's reasoning in
CTS that corporate laws which apply to foreign corporations are unconstitutional).
230. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's reasoning in
CTS that corporate laws which apply to foreign corporations are unconstitutional).
231. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's decision in CTS
that states cannot impose inconsistent regulations on corporations).
232. See supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text (explaining why fair price statutes that
apply to foreign corporations may be unconstitutional under commerce clause analysis). In finding
fair price statutes unconstitutional, courts may note that in CTS, the Court found that states have
an interest in regulating shareholders' affairs in domestic corporations. S. PazpnEro, supra note
7, at 44. Accordingly, courts that find fair price statutes that apply to foreign corporations
unconstitutional may reason that the state's interest rest solely in domestic. corporations rather
than its resident shareholders. Id.
233. See supra notes 176-232 and accompanying text (analyzing constitutionality of fair price
statutes under supremacy clause and commerce clause).
234. See supra notes 178-87 and accompanying text (while Williams Act regulates tender
offer, fair price statutes regulate merger phase of two-tiered tender offer).
235. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (noting that if party can comply with both
state and federal law, Williams Act does not preempt state statute).
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The Williams Act, therefore, does not appear to preempt fair price
statutes. 23 6 In addition fair price statutes do not seem to violate the
commerce clause by overly burdening interstate commerce. 23 7 While fair
price statutes burden interstate trade by making a tender offer more
expensive for the offeror, fair price statutes attempt to protect shareholders
by ensuring that minority shareholders receive consideration for the shares
of the target corporation that at least equals the amount the offeror paid
for the shares during the tender offer.23 8 Moreover, the provisions of fair
price statutes incorporate protective features, such as dissenters' rights to
appraisal and supermajority voting requirements, that state corporate laws
traditionally have allowed corporations to elect to include in their char-
ters. 23 9 The states' legitimate interests in protecting shareholders appear to
outweigh any burden that fair price statutes impose on interstate commerce
and do not discrimination between resident and nonresidentshareholders. 240
Accordingly, most fair price statutes should survive constitutional chal-
lenges. 2
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236. See supra notes 178-87 and accompanying text (noting that Williams Act does not
preempt fair price statutes).
237. See supra notes 212-225 and accompanying text (analyzing constitutionality of fair price
statutes under commerce clause, in light of burden that statutes place on interstate commerce).
238. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (explaining how fair price statutes ensure
that minority shareholders receive fair price for shares of target corporation).
239. See supra note 131 (fair price statutes protect shareholders with regulations that are
analogous to areas of corporate law that states traditionally have regulated, such as supermajority
voting requirements and dissenters' right to appraisal).
240. See supra notes 217-25 and accompanying text (fair price statutes protect shareholders,
which is legitimate state interest that outweighs certain burdens on interstate commerce that fair
price statutes may have in deterring takeover attempts).
241. See supra notes 176-240 and accompanying text (analyzing constitutionality of fair price
statutes).
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